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TORT LIABILITY FOR GOLF SHOTS:
TIME TO REJECT THE RECKLESSNESS STANDARD
AND RESPECT THE RULES OF GOLF
Gregory M. Dexter*
I. INTRODUCTION
In other sports the opponent is regarded as the enemy. We seek by
our actions to disable him. In tennis, our stroke defeats him; in football,
our tackle lays him low. . . . The golfer on the other hand is never
directly affected by his opponent's actions. He comes to realize that the
game is not against his foe, but against himself ...
Consider the golfer's relation to the rules. . . . This too differs from
every other sport. In baseball, a batter, knowing a pitch to be over the
plate, will argue vociferously with an umpire to the opposite effect, try-
ing to avoid having a strike called on him. The tennis player will bitterly
contest a line call he knows to be fair, the footballer vehemently declare
his innocence of a penalty he knows he committed.
It is only in golf . . . that players routinely call penalties on
themselves.'
On October 7, 2010, sixty-nine-year-old Hiroshi Tango was hit in
the back of the head with an errant golf ball while playing golf at a
California country club and pronounced dead by a coroner nine days
later.2 Apparently Hiroshi was standing ten to twenty yards ahead of
his playing partners when one of their pulled3 shots struck him with-
* Banking, finance, & securities attorney in private practice. J.D., Temple University School
of Law (cum laude, law review); B.A., Tulane University, Political Economy (cum laude) (greg-
ory.m.dexter@gmail.com). I would like to thank the editorial staff of the DePaul Journal of
Sports Law & Contemporary Problems for their diligent review of this Article. Any errors that
remain are my own.
1. STEVEN PRESSFIELD, THE LEGEND OF BAGGER VANCE: A NOVEL OF GOLF AND THE
GAME oi Li i 121 (William Morrow and Company 1995) (internal quotations omitted).
2. Randall Mell, Deadly Hooks and Slices, THE GOLF CHANNEL (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.
thegolfchannel.com/tour-insider/deadly-hooks-and-slices.
3. A pull is a shot "that flies in a fairly straight path to the left of the target line" when played
by a right-handed player. The converse occurs for a left-handed player. Pi i iz DAVIl:S, GOLi ING
Ti izms FiOM 1500 io Pizi YsN 133-34 (Bison Books 4th ed. 1992).
I
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out warning.4 Under California law, Hiroshi's estate will have no
cause of action against his partner because this conduct was not "so
reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity in-
volved in [golf]."9 California adheres to the recklessness standard,6
which does not impose a duty on golfers to give warning to co-partici-
pants who might foreseeably be injured by an errant golf shot7 -de-
spite this being a clear violation of the Rules of Golf.8 Remarkably,
California is not the only state to adhere to the recklessness standard.9
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals in Anand v. Kapoor1o-a
case that garnered international media attention'1 -refused to hold a
golfer liable when his shanked12 shot struck his partner in the eye,
4. Mell, supra note 2 (twenty yards); BRIEF: Golfer Hit in Head With Golf Ball, Dies, Oct. 19,
2010 (KTLA-TV, Los Angeles) (ten yards).
5. Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 583 (Cal. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Knight v. Jewett,
834 P.2d 696, 711 (Cal. 1992)).
6. It is actually more precise to say that under California law, golfers assume the risk of negli-
gence. See infra Part II.B.2.i for an analysis of how the doctrine of primary assumption of risk
under California law requires injured golfers to plead reckless or intentional conduct.
7. See infra Part II.C.3.i for a discussion of the failure to give warning before hitting a golf ball
under the recklessness standard.
8. U.S. Goi Ass'N, Tim; Rni is oni Go 2010-2011 1 (2009). The first rule of golf safety
provides "[p]layers should ensure that no one is standing close by or in a position to be hit by ...
the ball . . . when they make a stroke or practice swing." The fourth rule of golf safety provides
"[i]f a player plays a ball in a direction where there is a danger of hitting someone, he should
immediately shout a warning. The traditional word of warning in such situations is "fore." See
infra note 205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rules of golf safety.
9. Courts in other states that adhere to the recklessness standard include: Hawaii, Indiana,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Texas. See infra note 117 for a discussion of
courts that adhere to the recklessness standard.
10. Anand v. Kapoor, 15 N.Y. 3d 946, 947-48 (2010).
11. See, e.g., Associated Press, Top NY Court upholds dismissal of golf "Fore" suit, WAI I S'.
J., Dec. 21, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/APbf30365cd6ef4d92b070dl684b099c
37.html; Associated Press, Court: Shanked shots an expected risk, ESPN, (Dec. 21, 2010, 11:18
AM), available at http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/news/story?id=5942382; Ashby Jones, If You
Yell "Fore" on a Golf Course, Are You Wasting Your Breath?, WALL Siainn J. LAw Bi oc
(Nov. 15, 2010, 5:24 PM), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/11/15/if-you-yell-fore-on-a-
golf-course-are-you-wasting-your-breath/; Ed Pilnkington, Golfing shankers told there is no need
for "Fore!", GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Dec. 22, 2010, 10:51 PM), available at http://www.guardian.co.
uk/world/201 0/dec/22/golf-fore-warning.
12. A shank is a shot hit off the hosel, which is the socket or neck-rather than the head-of
an iron club. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 93, 152. Another word for the hosel is the shank, which is
how the shot gets its name. Jim DANTE & LEo DIEGEL, TiiH NINE BAD Siios o Goi i 121
(Fireside 1947). More on the shank:
[The shank] is generally regarded as the most mysterious shot in golf. And, since
psychologists tell us that it is the unknown that terrifies, shanking is also the most terri-
fying shot in golf.
When you recall what happens to a shanked ball, that it flies off to the right at almost
right angles to the intended direction, and doesn't go far at that, you realize why it is so
feared. Another reason the shank is so dreaded is that it strikes without warning.
Id. at 120.
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causing retinal detachment and permanent vision loss.' 3 Indeed, the
current trend among courts is to adopt the recklessness standard-the
majority rule in the context of recreational sports generally1 4  to
golf.15
This trend is a relatively new development: before 1990, no court
required golfers to plead more than ordinary negligence to recover for
injuries sustained by an errant golf ball.16 The negligence standard re-
quires golfers to use ordinary, or reasonable care.17 At its core, this
standard imposes a duty on golfers to give timely and adequate warn-
ing, customarily by yelling "fore,"'8 before hitting if another individ-
ual is within the "foreseeable zone of danger." 19 If another individual
is not within the foreseeable zone of danger, a golfer has no duty to
warn of his intention to hit, but must give timely and adequate warn-
ing if it becomes apparent that his2 0 ball has endangered another.21
13. Anand, 15 N.Y. 3d at 947-48.
14. Schick v. Ferolito, 767 A.2d 962, 965 (N.J. 2001) (noting that the majority of jurisdictions
apply the recklessness standard to recreational sports generally). Some examples of recreational
sports include pick-up basketball games, ice skating, touch football, polo, intra-office softball
games, karate matches, and roller skating. Id.
15. See infra Part II.B.2 for an analysis of the current trend of adopting the recklessness stan-
dard to golf.
16. The first case to do so was Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio 1990).
17. E.g., Alexander v. Wrenn, 164 S.E. 715, 716 (Va. 1932).
18. "Fore" is the customary warning given when a ball is played in the direction of hitting
someone. U.S. Goi Ass'N, supra note 8, at 1. "Fore" is the warning given "when a player is
about to play toward people on the course who might be within range." DAVIEs, supra note 3, at
68. The etymology:
The traditional warning "fore" is shouted when there is a danger of hitting someone with a ball.
While the exact etymology of the term is uncertain, a popular view traces the term "fore" to
military operations. During the 17th and 18th century, the infantry advanced in formation while
artillery batteries fired over their heads. When an artilleryman was about to fire, he would yell
"beware before." This fore-warning allowed the infantrymen to drop and cover to avoid being
hit. On the golf course, the warning has been shortened to "fore."
JOHN H. MILLER, THE LITTLE GREEN BOOK OF GOLF LAw 148 (2007). Another interpretation:
"[f]ore' is another word for 'ahead,'. . and may have evolved from the word 'forecaddie,' a
person accompanying a group around a golf course who often went forward to be in a position to
pinpoint the location of the group's shots." Thomas v. Wheat, 143 P.3d 767, 768 n.1 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2006).
19. See infra Part 1.A.ii.a for a discussion of the foreseeable zone of danger. Of course, the
foreseeable zone of danger concept in tort law has its roots in Justice Cardozo's famous opinion
in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
20. Throughout this Comment, the pronouns "he," "his," and "him" are used and are not
meant to convey the masculine gender alone; the reader has been spared awkward constructions
and unnecessary wordiness by this choice.
21. See infra Part 11.2. for an analysis of golfers' duties after the ball is hit under the negli-
gence standard.
4 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
This standard conforms to the Rules of Golf,22 which contain four
rules of safety. 23
This Comment argues that courts should reject the current trend
and reaffirm the negligence standard as the appropriate standard for
golf. The rationales for the recklessness standard-a standard that has
its roots in sports where physical contact is the norm24-simply do not
hold up when applied to golf. 25 Occupying an uncertain penumbra be-
tween negligence and intent, recklessness is a nebulous standard inca-
pable of being applied consistently. 26 In stark contrast, the negligence
standard is the appropriate approach because it conforms to the well-
established Rules of Golf.2 7 As a result, the negligence standard pro-
vides golfers and courts with a clearly defined standard of care, 28 is in
keeping with the spirit of the game, 2 9 is consistent with golfers' rea-
sonable expectations,o and is consistent with the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.31 Moreover, this standard merely asks golfers to act
reasonably 32-a flexible and commonsense approach that courts and
juries have great experience in applying-so that severely injured
plaintiffs are not forced to bear the costs of preventable injuries
caused by negligent conduct.33
This Comment proceeds as follows: Section II.A outlines the negli-
gence standard. Section II.B outlines the recklessness standard. Sec-
tion II.C focuses on the Rules of Golf, golf etiquette, and the
22. See infra notes 194-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Rules of Golf.
23. See infra note 205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the four rules of golf safety.
24. See infra note 235 and accompanying text for a discussion of the point that the Reckless-
ness standard has its roots in contact sports.
25. See infra Part IB.1 for a discussion of the rationales for the recklessness standard in
recreational sports. See infra Part 11I.A.A for an analysis of why the rationales for the reckless-
ness standard fail when applied to golf.
26. See infra notes 281-87 for an analysis of the nebulous nature of the recklessness standard
and the resulting inconsistencies that it produces.
27. See infra Part II.C.1 for an analysis of how the negligence standard conforms to the Rules
of Golf.
28. See infra Part III.B.1.i for an analysis of how the negligence standard provides courts and
golfers with a clearly defined standard of care.
29. See infra Part IIB .1.ii for an analysis of how the negligence standard is consistent with
the long-standing traditions of golf and the spirit of the game.
30. See infra Part III.B.1.iii for an analysis of how the negligence standard is consistent with
golfers' reasonable expectations.
31. See infra Part III.B.1.iv for an analysis of how the negligence standard is consistent with
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
32. See infra Part III.B.2 for an analysis of how the negligence standard merely asks partici-
pants to act reasonably, thereby holding golfers to a standard of care that can be easily met, and
likewise providing courts and juries with a flexible and commonsense standard that can be easily
assessed.
33. See infra notes 292-94 for a discussion of how the recklessness standard shifts costs from
negligent injurers to innocent, and often severely injured, plaintiffs.
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relationship between rule violations and liability (or lack thereof). In
Section III.A, this Comment makes the argument that the reckless-
ness standard is inappropriate for golf. Section JJJ.B then explains
why the negligence standard is the appropriate approach. Section
III.C addresses critics by refuting potential objections to the negli-
gence standard. Finally, Section III.D provides a few suggestions for
future courts in applying the negligence standard, and Section III.E
concludes with a few suggestions for future courts that insist on apply-
ing the recklessness standard.
II. OVERVIEW
Even in non-golf circles, it is common knowledge "that not every
shot played by a golfer goes to the point where he intends it to go. If
such were the case, every player would be perfect and the whole plea-
sure of the sport would be lost." 34 Courts recognize that "every star
sometimes, and every 'dub'35 oftentimes, hookS36 or slices.37" 38 There-
fore, under neither the negligence standard nor the recklessness stan-
dard is there a duty to refrain from hitting a shot unskillfully or
incompetently.39 After agreeing on this, however, the negligence and
recklessness jurisprudence go their separate ways. Accordingly, each
standard is considered in turn.
A. A Century of Golf Jurisprudence: The Negligence Standard
It is black letter law that to succeed on a negligence claim, the plain-
tiff must establish that (1) the defendant owed him a duty of care, (2)
34. Benjamin v. Nernberg, 157 A. 10, 11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1931). As of the writing of this Com-
ment, at least thirteen courts have directly quoted this language. See, e.g., Thompson v. McNeill,
559 N.E.2d 705, 709 (Ohio 1990). Countless others have paraphrased it.
35. A "dub" is an unskillful player. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 56.
36. A hook is a shot that curves strongly from the right to left when hit by a right-handed
player. The converse occurs for a left-handed player. Id. at 92.
37. A slice is the exact opposite of a hook. A slice curves strongly from the left to right when
hit by a right-handed player. The converse occurs for a left-handed player. DAVIES, supra note 3,
at 156. A slice is "the most common fault in golf beyond the shadow of a doubt. At a conserva-
tive guess, 90 per cent [sic] of the people who take up the game quickly become chronic slicers
unless they are caught in time by expert instruction." DANTE & DIEGEL, supra note 12, at 43.
One golf legend noted that "[m]any golfers are plagued with a slice or hook while trying to play
a straight shot." BEN HOGAN, POWER GOLF 84 (Gallery Books 1948).
38. Getz v. Freed, 105 A.2d 102, 103 (Pa.1954).
39. For a case reaching this conclusion under the recklessness standard, see, for example, Al-
len v. Donath, 875 S.W.2d 438, 443 (Vance, J., concurring) (noting defendant "owed no duty to
avoid hitting the ball incompetently or unskillfully"). For a case reaching this conclusion under
the negligence standard, see, for example, Benjamin, 157 A. at 11 (noting "many bad shots must
result although every stroke is delivered with the best possible intention and without any negli-
gence whatsoever").
2012] 5
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the defendant breached that duty, and (3) the plaintiff's injuries were
(4) proximately caused by that breach.4 0 Because liability hinges on
duty, it is essential to note-especially for readers more acquainted
with the links41 than the law-that duty "is not sacrosanct in itself, but
is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection." 42
This policy decision is one for the courts.43
Under the negligence standard, a golfer's duty is to act with reason-
able care under the circumstances. 4 4 This Section discusses this duty
under two time frames: (1) before the ball is hit, and (2) after the ball
is hit.
1. Golfers' Duties Before the Ball is Hit
i. The General Rule
The negligence standard imposes the general rule that:
[B]efore driving, it is [a golfer's] duty to give timely [and ade-
quate] 45 warning to persons unaware of his intention to hit whom he
knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, are in
line, or so close to the intended line of flight of the ball that danger to
them reasonably might be anticipated. 46
In other words, a golfer has a duty to warn prior to hitting if, and
only if, there are other individuals in the foreseeable zone of danger.4 7
This duty is discharged once those in the foreseeable zone of danger
either remove themselves from the danger zone 48 or reach a place of
reasonable safety and have had an opportunity to prepare for the im-
pending shot.4 9
40. E.g., Cook v. Johnston, 688 P.2d 215, 216 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
41. Colloquially, "links" refers to a golf course of any kind. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 105.
Technically, the term refers to the type of land characteristic of Scotland: low-lying seaside
land-characteristically sandy, treeless, undulating, often with dunes and bent grass. Id. at 104.
42. WILI IAM L. PizoSSlil IT I AL., PIossI It & Ki Al ON ON Iln: LAW 01 Toirrs § 58 358 (5th
ed. 1984) (emphasis added).
43. E.g., Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 584 (Cal. 2007).
44. E.g., Alexander v. Wrenn, 164 S.E. 715, 716 (Va. 1932).
45. E.g., Getz v. Freed, 105 A.2d 102, 103 (Pa. 1954) (noting that the warning must be
adequate).
46. Alexander, 164 S.E. at 716.
47. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Chebuhar, 479 N.W.2d 321, 323 (Iowa 1992).
48. Allen v. Pinewood Country Club, 292 So.2d 786, 790 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (noting "the
mere shouting of a warning is insufficient to discharge the duty to warn if the player does not
permit the player ahead sufficient time to step aside to avoid the danger"). Indeed, "a warning
followed by an immediate play, without ascertaining that the warning has been heeded, is the
equivalent of no warning at all." Id. See infra, Appendix, Figure 1 for a diagram of Allen.
49. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the point that if a golfer is
aware of a defendant's intention to hit and has reached a place of reasonable safety-although
[Vol. 9:1
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ii. The Foreseeable Zone of Danger
While a golfer's duty to warn extends only to those within the fore-
seeable zone of danger (or the "foreseeable ambit of danger"), 0 there
is no fixed rule of law that establishes the precise physical contours of
this area.5' Therefore, courts determine the foreseeable zone of dan-
ger in two inter-related ways: (1) where it is foreseeable that the ball
might travel based on the specific facts of the case 5 2 and (2) based on
prior law. 3
a. Establishing the Foreseeable Zone of Danger Based on the
Specific Facts of the Case
As courts have uncontroversially noted, "[s]hanking the ball is a
foreseeable and not uncommon occurrence in the game of golf. The
same is true of hooking, slicing, pushing,5 4 or pulling a golf shot."59
And although they are far less dangerous (and less common), we
would be remiss to forget about their friends topping,5 6 smothering,57
skying, 8 and sclaffing 59-all of which have been known to rear their
perhaps technically still within the foreseeable zone of danger-the defendant has discharged his
duty of care.
50. Ludwikoski v. Kurotsu, 875 F. Supp. 727, 732 (D. Kan. 1995).
51. Jenks v. McGranaghan, 285 N.E.2d 876, 878 (N.Y. 1972).
52. Bartlett, 479 N.W.2d at 322-23; see Boozer v. Arizona Country Club, 434 P.2d 630, 633
(Ariz. 1967) (noting that "negligence is based on foreseeability").
53. See infra Part II.A.1.ii.b for a discussion regarding how courts determine the foreseeable
zone of danger based on prior law.
54. A push is a shot that "flies in a fairly straight path to the right of a target line" when
played by a right-handed player. The converse occurs for a left-handed player. DAVIEs, supra
note 3, at 134. "A pushed shot is usually a straight ball that goes to the right of the target. We
say usually it is a straight ball because at times it can develop into a slice as well as a push."
DANTE & DIEGEL, supra note 12, at 98. When a pushed shot also slices, the authors joke that the
ball will be so off target that "you are just lucky to ever find it. The next county is the best place
to start looking." Id.
55. E.g., Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705, 709 (Ohio 1990).
56. Topping is a "vile member of the bad-shot family" and is caused by "one of three things:
jerking the head up, swaying or raising the arc of the swing." DANTE & DIEGEL, supra note 12, at
71. Tragically, a topped shot will hardly advance past the teebox, and because it has the potential
to shatter a golfer's confidence, "[n]o golfer needs to be reminded of the immediate and com-
plete catastrophe that can follow a top." Id.
57. "A smother is caused, of course, by a face that is hooded at the moment it strikes the ball
... [I]t is impossible, therefore, to hit the ball into the air. It must go into the ground quickly."
Id. at 84-86. In fact, "[t]his choice little number can kill all your better instincts unless you cor-
rect it quickly. It is a deadening, soul-searing thing that can descend on you suddenly and blight
your afternoon completely." Id. at 84.
58. A sky is "one of the peculiar and not too common bad shots of golf. It's the shot that soars
high in the air and doesn't go very far." Id. at 105.
59. Sclaffling is the result of one or more swing faults, causing "the head [of the club] to hit
the ground behind the ball." Id. at 115. The term, however, is rarely used today. LORNE RUBEN-
STEIN & JEFF NEUMAN, A DISORDERLY COMPENDIUM OF GOLF 264 (2006).
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ugly heads and spoil a good round of golf. 60 Therefore, the majority
rule in the negligence jurisprudence is that the foreseeable zone of
danger is not merely confined to the intended line of flight, but in-
stead "encompasses a wider zone of danger based on the facts and
circumstances in each individual case." 61
The one fact that courts weigh most heavily when determining the
foreseeability of a deviation from the intended line of flight-and thus
the scope of the zone of danger-is the skill level of the golfer.6 2 The
Supreme Court of Minnesota observed, "the poorer the player the
greater is the zone of danger." 6 3 A leading case is Cook v. Johnston, in
which the court held that whether the defendant's known propensity
to shank extended the zone of danger was a jury question. 64 Similarly,
and conversely, the District Court of Kansas held that a plaintiff was
not within the foreseeable zone of danger largely because the defen-
dant was a skilled golfer.65 The court's holding was based on uncon-
tested evidence that the defendant:
[w]as an experienced golfer who plays dozens of times a year, that
he has had professional training, and that he constantly practices ....
60. Few works on the subject of golf and torts would be complete without mentioning Mark
Twain's quip that "golf is a good walk spoiled." See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 701
(2001) (noting Twain's quote).
61. Bartlett v. Chebuhar, 479 N.W.2d 321, 322-23 (Iowa 1992) (emphasis added) (citing Cook
v. Johnston, 688 P.2d 215, 217 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)); see Ludwikoski v. Kurotsu, 875 F. Supp.
727, 732 (D. Kan. 1995) (noting that the foreseeable zone of danger rule-which is not confined
to the intended line of flight-is followed in the majority of jurisdictions); Thomas v. Wheat, 143
P.3d 767, 770 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006) (noting that the majority rule is that the zone of danger
extends beyond the intended line of flight). For the minority rule, see Cavin v. Kasser, 820
S.W.2d 647, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (stating the duty to warn extends only to "those within the
range of the intended flight of the ball or the general direction of the drive").
62. See Ludwikoski, 875 F. Supp. at 731 (noting golfer's high level of skill made it less likely
that he would injure plaintiff); Hollinbeck v. Downey, 113 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Minn. 1962) (noting
"the poorer the player the greater is the zone of danger"); Alexander v. Wrenn, 164 S.E. 715, 717
(Va. 1932) (noting that the defendant was a "wild and erratic player and knew that a golf ball
struck by him was liable to fly at almost any angle"); Cook v. Johnston, 688 P.2d 215, 217 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1984) (holding whether defendant's "propensity to shank" widened the foreseeable
zone of danger was a jury question).
63. Hollinbeck, 113 N.W.2d at 12.
64. Cook, 688 P.2d at 217 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). In Cook, the defendant's shanking problem
was so severe that the defendant scheduled six lessons with a club professional to help him cure
it. Id. at 216. The first lesson did not get off to an auspicious start; according to the professional,
the defendant shanked approximately one out of every three shots forty-five to fifty degrees
from the intended line of flight. Id. at 217. (To get a perspective of this, note the fifty-degree line
on the figures in the Appendix, infra. This line denotes fifty degrees from the intended line of
flight). After he completed the second of his six scheduled lessons, the defendant played a round
of golf with the plaintiff, in which he shanked a shot that hit the plaintiff in the eye, causing
severe permanent injury. Id. at 216. One interesting question the court left open was whether the
defendant had a duty to warn of his propensity to shank. Id. at 217.
65. Ludwikoski, 875 F. Supp. at 731.
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that he had a smooth consistent swing, that he knew how to properly
hold the club, that his tee shots on the first seventeen holes were
straight down the fairway with no hook and only an occasional fade 66
to the right.67
Other factors that the court suggested could extend the zone of dan-
ger are intoxication, 68 rushing to hit a shot,69 or hitting a shot in a
manner inconsistent with routine or common practice. 70 The court
reasoned that an absence of these factors sufficiently reduced the
foreseeable zone of danger so that the plaintiff was not within its
boundaries when she was injured and therefore held that the defen-
dant was not negligent as a matter of law.71
b. Establishing the Foreseeable Zone of Danger Based on Prior
Law
In addition to considering the specific facts of the case, courts often
turn to prior law to determine whether the plaintiff was within the
foreseeable zone of danger. Under this analysis, a finding of negli-
gence can be precluded "if the distance and angle are great enough
[that the plaintiff was] not within the danger zone as defined by previ-
ous cases." 72 In other words, "somewhere between zero and ninety
degrees, there is a dividing line-a deviation which might, as a matter
of law, preclude a finding of negligence."73
At the most general level of this analysis, the Supreme Court of
Arizona held that a finding of negligence could be precluded if the
plaintiff was not within ninety degrees of the defendant's intended
line of flight.74 In looking for authority to narrow this scope, the court
noted that the plaintiff in Benjamin v. Nernberg was approximately
fifty degrees from the intended line of flight and received a jury ver-
66. A fade is a "[c]ontrolled and moderate left-to-right curve on a shot by a right-handed
player." The converse occurs for a left-handed player. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 61.
67. Ludwikoski, 875 F. Supp. at 731.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 731-32.
72. Anand v. Kapoor, 877 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (quoting Jenks v. Mc-
Granaghan, 285 N.E.2d 876, 878 (N.Y. 1972)), aff'd. 15 N.Y.3d 946, 947-48 (2010).
73. Boozer v. Arizona Country Club, 434 P.2d 630, 633-34 (Ariz. 1967).
74. Id. What exactly does ninety degrees from the intended line of flight mean? If you draw a
line from the tee toward the golfer's target-if the ball follows that line, there is zero degrees
deviation-a ninety degree deviation would mean that nobody standing behind a line drawn
perpendicular to the intended line of flight would be within the zone of danger. See infra Appen-
dix for a visual representation of this.
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dict in his favor.79 The trial court in Benjamin, however, entered a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the appellate court af-
firmed. 76 Perhaps because the trial judge in Benjamin overturned the
jury and the appellate court affirmed, the fifty degree line has not
been recognized among courts as the official boundary line for the
zone of danger.77 Or perhaps this is simply too wide of a zone to
impose a duty to warn. At the very least, the fifty-degree line sheds
light on the outer limits of the zone of danger: no plaintiff outside of
fifty degrees from the intended line of flight has yet to be found to be
within the foreseeable zone of danger.
iii. Exceptions to the General Rule
The negligence jurisprudence carves out at least four exceptions to
the general duty to warn before hitting. First, a golfer has no duty to
re-check the zone of danger once he fixes his concentration on the
ball.7 8 The New York Court of Appeals observed, "a golfer cannot be
expected to break his concentration while addressing the ball the in-
stant before he hits to look up and see if someone has just stepped
into the danger zone."79
Second, even if the defendant is aware that the plaintiff is within the
foreseeable zone of danger, there is no duty to warn if the plaintiff is
75. Id. at 633 (citing Benjamin v. Nernberg, 157 A. 10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1931)). The plaintiff in
Benjamin was "120 feet to the left [of the defendant] and forward ... about 100 feet." 157 A. at
10. The plaintiff in Benjamin is the farthest plaintiff from the intended line of flight to receive a
jury verdict in his favor. See infra Appendix, Figure 1 for empirical evidence of the zone of
danger under the negligence standard and note that no plaintiff has been able to sustain a cause
of action when injured outside of fifty degrees from the intended line of flight. The fifty degree
line is derived from Benjamin.
76. Boozer, 434 P.2d at 633; Benjamin, 157 A. at 11.
77. Furthermore, the Benjamin court-rather than provide the fifty-degree measurement-
observed that the plaintiff was "120 feet to the left [of the defendant] and forward ... about 100
feet." 157 A. at 10. As a result, courts have largely overlooked the fifty-degree measurement.
Simple trigonometry can be used to determine that these coordinates would mean that the plain-
tiff in Benjamin was 50.19 degrees from the intended line of flight. Because the court's measure-
ments were merely approximations (as are, presumably, all of the measurements provided by the
courts discussed in this Comment), it is appropriate to round this number to fifty degrees. It
appears that the first court to make this connection was Boozer, 434 P.2d at 633.
78. Jenks v. McGranaghan, 285 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (N.Y. 1972). It could be said that a golfer
has no duty to check the zone of danger once he "addresses" his golf ball. A golfer addresses his
golf ball when he takes his stance and prepares to hit. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 11. According to
the Rules of Golf, "a player has 'addressed the ball' when he has taken his stance and has also
grounded his club." U.S. Goii ASs'N, supra note 8, at 5. However, it is more accurate to say that
there is no duty to check the zone of danger once the golfer fixes his concentration on his golf
ball because it is possible (although unlikely) to address the golf ball while still looking ahead
towards the target.
79. Jenks, 285 N.E.2d at 878-79.
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aware of the defendant's intention to hitso and the plaintiff is in a
place of reasonable safety.81 In such a situation, a warning would be
superfluous. 82
The third exception-although more a caveat than an exception-is
the adult-activities rule.83 In an action against a minor for negligence,
the general rule is that the minor is held to the standard of care of a
reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under the
circumstances. 84 The adult-activities rule is an exception courts often
invoke when the minor engages in a dangerous activity generally only
undertaken by adults and that requires an adult level of skill.89 Exam-
ples include driving a car, tractor, motorcycle, or snowmobile. 8 6 In
these situations, the minor is held to the adult standard of care be-
cause the very nature of the activity makes it dangerous regardless of
whether it is conducted by a minor or an adult.87 One court applied
this exception to golf, reasoning that a golf ball in flight is a "danger-
ous missile," creating the same dangers to others regardless of age.88
Fourth, some negligence courts distinguish between the duty owed
to golfers on other holes and golfers in one's own group. Under this
distinction, there is no duty to warn golfers within the foreseeable
zone of danger if they are on a different hole, and not within the in-
tended line of flight.89 Louisiana courts, for example, have consist-
80. See Boyton v. Ryan, 257 F.2d 70, 72-73 (3d Cir. 1958); Wood v. Postelthwaite, 496 P. 2d
988, 991 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972).
81. Schmidt v. Youngs, 544 N.W.2d 743, 744-45 (1996).
82. Boyton, 257 F.2d at 72; Kelly v. Forester, 311 S.W.2d 547 (Ky. 1958) (holding that a warn-
ing would be superfluous when plaintiff was aware of defendant's intention to hit and was lo-
cated approximately eighty-five to ninety degrees to the right of plaintiff).
83. Neumann v. Shlansky, 294 N.Y.S.2d 628, 632-33 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 1968), affd, 312 N.Y.S.2d
951 (N.Y. App. Term 1970), aff'd, 318 N.Y.S.2d 925 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971). See RESTATEMENT
(Tiiiizi) o Toizis § 10 cmt. f (2010) (noting that when "children choose to engage in dangerous
activities characteristically engaged in by adults, no account is taken of their childhood" and they
are held to the standard of care of a reasonably prudent adult).
84. Neumann, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
85. Id.
86. Ri;STA1TIMINI (TiiiinD) 01 ToRps § 10 cmt. f
87. Neumann, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
88. Id. at 635 (holding eleven-year-old golfer to adult standard of care). But see Kirchoffner v.
Quam, 264 N.W.2d 203, 207 (N.D. 1978) (noting that although the trend is to hold minors to
adult standard of care when engaging in a dangerous activity normally only undertaken by
adults, the court doubted whether it would hold defendant-a fifteen-year-old golfer-to adult
standard of care if that question were properly before it).
89. Jenks v. McGranaghan, 285 N.E.2d 876, 878 (N.Y. 1972) (stating there is generally "no
duty to warn persons not in the intended line of flight on another tee or fairway"); Cavin v.
Kasser, 820 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (stating "there is generally no duty to warn
persons not in the intended line of flight on another tee or fairway"); Baker v. Thibodaux, 470
So.2d 245, 247 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (stating there is "no duty to give advance warning to persons
on contiguous holes or fairways where the danger to them is not reasonably anticipated" (quot-
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ently embraced this distinction90 and, under certain circumstances,
have held that there is no duty to warn persons on other holes-even
holes that are parallel, contiguous, and run in opposite directions.91
2. Golfers' Duties After the Ball is Hit
i. The General Rule
"It appears to be an accepted rule of golf that, if no duty to warn
exists prior to the striking of a ball, one does exist when it becomes
apparent the ball is errant." 9 2 Once the ball is hit, therefore, a golfer
has a duty to give a timely and adequate warning, customarily by yell-
ing "fore" to all those who have become endangered by an errant
shot.93 This duty extends, of course, even to individuals not within the
foreseeable zone of danger. 94 No matter how poor the shot, a timely
and adequate warning discharges the duty and shields the golfer from
liability. 5
ing Murphy v. Podgurski, 236 So. 2d 508, 509 (La. Ct. App. 1970)); see also Rose v. Morris, 104
S.E.2d 485, 488 (Ga. Ct. App. 1954) (holding that defendant did not breach his duty to warn and
noting defendant and plaintiff were on different fairways). See infra Appendix, Figure 1 for a
diagram of Rose.
90. See Baker, 470 So.2d at 247 (noting Louisiana jurisprudence "indicates a clear distinction
between the duty owed to golfers on other tees and to players in one's own group" and that a
golfer "is under no duty to give advance warning to persons on contiguous holes or fairways
where the danger to them is not reasonably anticipated" (quoting Murphy v. Podgurski, 236 So.
2d 508, 509 (La. Ct. App. 1970)).
91. Baker, 470 So.2d at 250 (affirming the lower court's decision that defendant was not negli-
gent when he failed to warn plaintiff of his intention to hit when plaintiff was on a parallel and
contiguous hole). But the court's reasoning could probably be explained, in part, by the twenty-
five foot trees between holes. Id. at 249. It is worth noting that the Supreme Court of California
(which follows the recklessness standard) explicitly refused this distinction, noting that "[t]he
question of duty involves the relationship of the parties to the sport . . . . [C]o participants have
the same relationship to the sport whether they are in the same playing group or not." Shin v.
Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 588 (Cal. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
92. Cavin, 820 S.W.2d at 651.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Carrigan v. Roussell, 426 A.2d 517, 521 (N.J. 1981) (holding that defendant had a
duty to warn once the ball started heading towards plaintiff, who was not within the foreseeable
zone of danger).
95. See, e.g., id. (noting that the defendant was not within the foreseeable zone of danger-
and therefore there was no duty to warn before hitting-but a duty to warn arose once it became
apparent that the ball was errant). Because the defendant satisfied this duty, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court's ruling that the plaintiff had no cause of action. Id. See infra Appendix,
Figure 1 for a diagram illustrating Carrigan. Although a warning of "fore" discharges liability for
poor shots, it does not exculpate reckless or intentional conduct. Neumann v. Shlansky, 294
N.Y.S.2d 628, 632 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 1968), aff'd, 312 N.Y.S.2d 951 (N.Y. App. Term 1970), aff'd,
318 N.Y.S.2d 925 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971).
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ii. Exceptions to the General Rule
The negligence jurisprudence makes at least two exceptions to the
general duty to warn after the ball is hit. The first is that-although
the customary method of warning is by yelling "fore"-a golfer may
have a duty to give a different warning if he is aware that this warning
would be ineffective.96 This exception derives from Thomas v. Wheat,
a case in which the plaintiff did not respond to a warning of "fore"
when the defendant's playing partner hit a tee shot that nearly hit
him.97 After observing the plaintiff's failure to respond, the defendant
then proceeded to hit her tee shot, which hooked toward the plaintiff
and struck him in the mouth.98 Although the defendant and her fellow
golfers gave a warning of "fore" once the defendant's ball headed to-
wards the plaintiff, the plaintiff testified that he never heard the warn-
ing. 99 The appellate court remanded the case for the jury to determine
whether the warning was adequate, noting "the fact that the other
golfer's 'fore' warning had been ineffective might lead a reasonable
person to conclude that a louder warning, different warning, or warn-
ing before the golf shot was necessary."100
The second exception is that there is no duty to warn if a warning
would be futile.101 The Court of Appeals of New York stated "the
pertinent question . .. is whether a warning, if given, would have been
effective in preventing the accident." 1 0 2 A court is likely to consider a
warning futile if the plaintiff is at such a short distance from the defen-
dant that the plaintiff would not realistically be able to avoid being
hit. 0 3 A warning might also be considered futile if the plaintiff would
96. Thomas v. Wheat, 143 P.3d 767, 770-71 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006). Although this is organized
as an exception to the general duty to warn by yelling "fore," it is not so much an exception as it
is an application of the general rule that the warning-by "fore" or otherwise-must be ade-
quate. See supra note 93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the duty to give adequate
warning after hitting under the negligence standard.
97. Thomas, 143 P.3d 767.
98. Id. at 769.
99. Id. at 770-71.
100. Id. In addition, the court remanded the case to determine if the defendant's propensity to
hook shots in the direction of the plaintiff imposed a duty to warn before hitting.
101. Rinaldo v. McGovern, 587 N.E.2d 264 (N.Y. 1991); Nussbaum v. Lacopo, 265 N.E.2d
762, 766 (N.Y. 1970). Cf Westborough Country Club v. Palmer, 204 F.2d 143, 148 (Mo. Ct. App.
1953) (noting that defendant-golfer's failure to yell "fore" could not be the intervening proxi-
mate cause of an accident when the golfer was so close to the plaintiff that the warning would be
futile).
102. Rinaldo, 587 N.E.2d at 266. But minimal effectiveness might not be enough to impose a
duty. The court went on to say that there is no duty to warn if the chances that the warning
would prevent the accident are too remote. Id.
103. See, e.g., Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705, 709 n.2 (Ohio 1990) (applying reckless-
ness standard, but noting that a warning would have availed plaintiff of nothing).
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be unlikely to hear the warning,104 unable to heed it,10s or unlikely to
respond.106
An example of the latter situation arose in Nussbaum v. Lacopo.10 7
In Nussbaum, the New York Court of Appeals refused to impose lia-
bility on a golfer whose hooked ball crossed twenty to thirty feet of
rough and struck and injured the plaintiff while he read a newspaper
on his patio.108 Although the defendant did not yell "fore" or give
another warning, the court held that there was no duty to warn be-
cause the plaintiff would be unlikely to respond.109 The court rea-
soned that "[1]iving so close to a golf course, plaintiff would
necessarily hear numerous warning shouts each day. As the warning
would ordinarily be directed to other golfers, plaintiff could be ex-
pected to ignore them." 110
Further applying this line of reasoning, the New York Court of Ap-
peals in Rinaldo v. McGovern refused to impose liability on the defen-
dant when his sliced ball traveled outside the confines of the golf
course and struck the window of the plaintiffs' car as they were travel-
ing on an adjacent road."' The plaintiffs brought suit charging, inter
alia, negligence on the theory of failure to warn. 1 1 2 The Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the trial court's dismissal, reasoning that a warning
would have been futile-it would have been highly unlikely that the
plaintiffs, driving in their car, would have somehow heard the warn-
ing.113 And even if the plaintiffs could have heard the warning, it was
even more unlikely that they could have successfully maneuvered
their car to avoid being hit.1 1 4
B. The Recent Trend: The Recklessness Standard and
Assumption of Risk
Under the recklessness standard, a golfer is not liable for mere neg-
ligence. 11s Instead, a golfer's duty is to abstain from inflicting injuries
104. Rinaldo, 587 N.E.2d at 266.
105. Id.
106. Nussbaum, 265 N.E.2d at 767.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 764.
109. Id. at 767.
110. Id. at 766.
111. Rinaldo, 587 N.E.2d at 265.
112. Id. at 266.
113. Id. at 266-67.
114. Id. at 266.
115. Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705, 706 (Ohio 1990).
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intentionally, willfully, wantonly, or recklessly.116 Recklessness is an
intermediate standard located somewhere between negligence and in-
tent, 17 which explains why attempts at coming to a workable defini-
tion of recklessness have been largely unsuccessful." 8
It is said that an individual acts recklessly "when he or she inten-
tionally commits an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a
known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable
that harm would follow, and which thus is usually accompanied by a
conscious indifference to those consequences."11 9  And generally,
"[r]recklessness, unlike negligence, requires a conscious choice of a
course of action, with knowledge or a reason to know that it will cre-
ate serious dangers to others."120 But one's conduct could be consid-
ered such an extreme deviation from the standard of reasonable care
that it is deemed reckless even though the actor did not subjectively
appreciate the risk. 1 2 1
In the latter situation, negligent conduct rises to the level of reck-
lessness based on the extent of the actor's deviation from what would
be expected from a reasonably prudent actor in the same or similar
circumstances. 12 2 The Restatement (Second) of Torts notes:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another
if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty
to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which
would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct cre-
116. Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 583 (Cal. 2007); Yoneda v. Tom, 133 P.3d 796, 808-09 (Haw.
2006); Schick v. Ferolito, 767 A.2d 962, 969 (N.J. 2001); Thompson, 559 N.E.2d at 706; Pfenning
v. Lineman, 922 N.E.2d 45, 52-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); Gray v. Giroux, 730 N.E.2d 338, 340
(Mass. Ct. App. 2000); Allen v. Donath, 875 S.W.2d 438, 440 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Hathaway v.
Tascosa Country Club, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 614, 617 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). Confusingly, "willful,
wanton, or reckless" have been interpreted to mean the same thing and will be considered for
purposes of this paper (as they generally are in courts) to fall under the umbrella of the reckless-
ness standard. As Prosser and Keaton note, "although efforts have been made to distinguish
[willful, wanton, and reckless], in practice such distinctions have consistently been ignored, and
the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing, or at least as coming out at the
same legal exit." WILLIAM L. PiOSi i I AL., supra note 42, § 34, at 212 (internal footnotes
omitted).
117. See, e.g., Thompson, 559 N.E.2d at 707-08 (noting that recklessness is an intermediate
standard).
118. See infra note 281 and accompanying text for a discussion of the confusion surrounding
recklessness.
119. Schick, 767 A.2d at 969 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSlilR HT AL., supra note 42, § 34, at 212
(emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id.; Ri;STATI MIENI (SIcoND) oi Toriis § 500 (1965) (noting that reckless conduct
involves a risk that is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make the conduct
negligent).
2012] 15
16 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
ates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that
such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make
his conduct negligent.1 2 3
In other words, "negligence may consist of an intentional act done
with knowledge that it creates a risk of danger to others, but reckless-
ness requires a substantially higher risk. The quantum of risk is the
important factor."12 4
1. Rationales for the Recklessness Standard in Recreational Sports
In recreational sports generally, courts advocate the recklessness
standard for several reasons. One is that imposing legal liability for
conduct that violates the rules "might well alter fundamentally the na-
ture of the sport by deterring participants from vigorously engaging in
activity that falls close to, but on the permissible side of, a prescribed
rule." 12 5 Similarly, the recklessness standard is said to be more appro-
priate than the negligence standard for furthering the dual policies of
the "promotion of vigorous participation in recreational sports and
the avoidance of a flood of litigation over sports accidents." 1 2 6 In ar-
ticulating these rationales for the recklessness standard, the California
Supreme Court stated:
[h]olding participants liable for missed hits would only encourage
lawsuits and deter players from enjoying the sport. Golf offers many
healthful advantages to both the golfer and the community. The physi-
cal exercise in the fresh air with the smell of the pines and eucalyptus
renews the spirit and refreshes the body. The sport offers an opportu-
nity for both recreation with friends and the chance to meet other
citizens with like interests. A foursome can be a very social event,
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 1965. The Restatement (Third) of Torts defines
recklessness as follows:
A person acts with recklessness in engaging in conduct if:
(a) the person knows of the risk of harm created by the conduct or knows facts that make that
risk obvious to anyone in the person's situation, and
(b) the precaution that would eliminate or reduce that risk involves burdens that are so slight
relative to the magnitude of the risk as to render the person's failure to adopt the precaution a
demonstration of the person's indifference to the risk.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2. Because the Third Restatement has only recently become
official, this Comment focuses primarily on the Second Restatement as it provides the definition
of recklessness used by the courts discussed in this Comment. However, see infra notes 281, 387-
391 for a discussion of how the Third Restatement may increase the likelihood of finding con-
duct on the golf course to be reckless.
124. Schick, 767 A.2d at 969 (emphasis added).
125. Dilger v. Moyles, 54 Cal. App. 4th 1452, 1454 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Knight v.
Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 716 (Cal. 1992)).
126. Schick, 767 A.2d at 965 (referring to recreational sports generally, and applying the same
rationales to golf).
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relieving each golfer of the stresses of business and everyday urban
life. Neighborhoods benefit by the scenic green belts golf brings to
their communities, and wild life enjoy and flourish in a friendly
habitat. Social policy dictates that the law should not discourage par-
ticipation in such an activity whose benefits to the individual player
and community at large are so great.127
The New Jersey Supreme Court noted at least two additional ratio-
nales for the recklessness standard in recreational sports. 128 First, "a
legal duty of care, based on the standard of what, objectively, an aver-
age reasonable person would do under the circumstances is illusory,
and is not susceptible to sound and consistent application on a case-
by-cases basis." 129 Second, "[d]ifferent standards applied to different
sports would lead to confusion among potential litigants."1 30 In addi-
tion to these rationales, some courts have argued that injury is an in-
herent risk assumed by participants of all sports, including golf. 131
2. Adoption of the Recklessness Standard to Golf- 1990 to 2011
The first court to adopt the recklessness standard for golf was the
Ohio Supreme Court.132 In 1990, Thompson v. McNeill announced
that "between participants in [golf], only injuries caused by intentional
conduct, or in some instances reckless misconduct, may give rise to a
cause of action. There is no liability for injuries caused by negligent
conduct."133 The court reasoned that "inadvertent harm is often built
into . . . sport," and that in golf, participants are "subjected to risk of
harm from balls struck . .. at considerable speed."134 The court, how-
ever, noted an inverse relationship between the dangerousness of a
sport and duty: the more dangerous the sport, the lesser the duty. 13 5
Therefore, "participants in bodily contact games such as basketball
(and lacrosse) owe a lesser duty to each other than do golfers and
others involved in non-physical contact sports."136 The court also
noted the importance of considering "the nature of the sport involved,
the rules and regulations which govern the sport, the customs and
127. Shin, 165 P.3d at 587 (quoting Dilger, 54 Cal. App. 4th at 1454-55).
128. Schick, 767 A.2d at 965.
129. Id. (citing Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 604 (N.J. 1994)).
130. Id. at 968 (citing Melissa Cohen, Note, Co-Participants in Recreational Activities Owe
Each Other a Duty not to Act Recklessly, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT. L. 187, 202 (2000)).
131. Id.; Thompson v. McNeil, 559 N.E.2d 705, 707 (Ohio 1990); Dilger, 54 Cal. App. 4th at
1454-55.
132. Thompson, 559 N.E.2d 705.
133. Id. at 706.
134. Id. at 707.
135. Id. at 708-09.
136. Id. at 708.
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practices which are generally accepted and which have evolved with
the development of the sport, and the facts and circumstances of the
particular case."13 7
In Thompson, the defendant hit her second shot on the twelfth hole
into a water hazard, and the plaintiff courteously went to search for
the defendant's ball near the water hazard, twelve to fifteen yards
from the defendant.138 It was at this time that the defendant dropped
a ball from where she hit her second shot and hit a third, 13 9 consistent
with the Rules of Golf.140 Unfortunately, this shot was shanked ap-
proximately ninety degrees from its intended line of flight and struck
the plaintiff in the right eye, causing severe injury.141 The facts were in
dispute both as to whether the defendant announced her intention to
hit prior to hitting and whether she gave warning once it became ap-
parent that her ball was heading towards the plaintiff. 14 2
The court found that this conduct was not reckless as a matter of
law and awarded summary judgment to the defendant. 1 4 3 The court
noted that "[s]hanking the ball is a foreseeable and not uncommon
occurrence in the game of golf,"1 4 4 and the defendant's third shot was
foreseeable and within the Rules of the game. 145 In addition, the court
reasoned that the plaintiff was at such a sharp angle that she was not
in the intended path of the ball.146 In dicta, the court noted that the
defendant's conduct was not even negligent because the plaintiff's po-
sition relative to the defendant placed her outside the zone of danger,
and therefore, the injury was merely the result of a "freak" shot. 147
Four years later, the recklessness standard was once again adopted
in golf, this time by a Texas appellate court. In Hathaway v. Tascosa
Country Club, Inc., the plaintiff suffered permanent vision loss in his
left eye when he was struck by a hooked golf ball hit by the defendant
from the driving range. 14 8 Once the defendant realized that the shot
137. Id. at 708-09.
138. Id. at 706. See infra Appendix, Figure 2 for a diagram of Thompson.
139. Thompson, 559 N.E.2d at 705.
140. U.S. GOLF Ass'N, supra note 8, at 78 (Rule 26-1). If a golfer's ball is in a water hazard,
the golfer may play the ball from the spot where the original ball was last played and take a one
stroke penalty. Id.
141. Thompson, 559 N.E.2d at 705.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 709.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 709 n.2.
147. Id. Interestingly, therefore, the court did not need to adopt the recklessness standard to
reach this disposition.
148. Hathaway v. Tascosa Country Club, Inc., 846 S.W.2d. 614, 615 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
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was hooking outside the confines of the driving range, he yelled
"fore," but the plaintiff, driving in a golf cart on an adjacent hole, was
unable to avoid being hit.149 Relying on Thompson and a Texas Ap-
pellate case that applied the recklessness standard to polo, 9 0 the
Hathaway court adopted the recklessness standard to golf and af-
firmed summary judgment for the defendant.151 Like the Thompson
court, the Hathaway court noted that the defendant's conduct did not
even amount to negligence. 152
Citing Thompson and Hathaway for support, the recklessness juris-
prudence was extended in 2001 when the Supreme Court of New
Jersey decided the case of Schick v. Ferolito and held that the reckless-
ness standard applies to all recreational sports, including golf.15 3 In-
deed, the court trumpeted "[recklessness] is the pertinent standard for
assessing the duty of one sports participant to another concerning con-
duct on golf courses and tennis courts, as well as conduct on basket-
ball courts and ice rinks." 1 5 4
In Schick, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant hit an unan-
nounced mulligan 55 after all members of the foursome had teed
off.15 6 When the defendant hit the mulligan, the plaintiff was in his
golf cart approximately thirty-five feet ahead of the tee-box at a forty-
five degree angle to the left.1' 7 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
already hit a first shot, which was sliced to the right-a poor shot, but
still in play.1s8 The defendant's account of the accident was somewhat
different: he did not remember whether the injury-causing shot was a
mulligan, but claimed that before teeing off, he made eye contact with
the plaintiff and gave a hand warning for him to move aside.'9
In an opinion by Justice LaVecchia, the majority of the court found
that there were disputed material facts and remanded the case for the
jury to assess whether the defendant's conduct constituted reckless-
149. Id. at 615.
150. Connell v. Payne, 814 S.W.2d. 486 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (writ denied).
151. Hathaway, 846 S.W.2d at 616-18.
152. Id. at 616. Again, this is a case where the court did not need to adopt the recklessness
standard to decide the case, but opted to do so anyway.
153. Schick v. Ferolito, 767 A.2d 962, 966-67 (N.J. 2001).
154. Id. at 968.
155. A mulligan is a replacement shot taken when a golfer is unsatisfied with his original shot.
It is prohibited by the Rules, but often customary in informal games. See infra Part III.C.ii for a
discussion of mulligans.
156. 767 A.2d at 963.
157. Id. at 964. See infra Appendix, Figure 3 for a diagram of Schick.
158. Id. at 964.
159. Id.
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ness.160 Justice Verniero concurred in adopting the recklessness stan-
dard to golf, but dissented in the disposition, finding that the
defendant's conduct was not reckless as a matter of law. 16 1 Verniero is
of the opinion that "[o]nly the most egregious acts of golfers should
give rise to liability" 162 and "[i]mplicit in the recklessness standard is a
requirement that the conduct be egregious."163
i. Assumption of Risk Under the Recklessness Standard
Unlike New Jersey, which abrogated the doctrine of assumption of
risk decades ago, 164 California, 165 Hawaii, 166 and (now) New York1 67
apply the defense of assumption of risk in recreational golf. There are
two types of assumption of risk: primary and secondary.168 The doc-
trine of primary assumption of risk "bars liability because the plaintiff
is said to have assumed the particular risks inherent in a sport by
choosing to participate." 169 While a golfer "owes no duty to a co-par-
ticipant for actions involving an inherent risk, "170 the golfer can be
held liable if "he or she intentionally injures another player or his or
her conduct was sufficiently reckless to be outside the normal or ordi-
nary part of the game."1 71 Thus, the doctrine arrives at the reckless-
ness standard because "the defendant owes no duty to protect a
plaintiff from particular harms arising from ordinary, or simple
negligence." 172
Primary assumption of risk is a legal conclusion that abrogates the
defendant's duty entirely-in the case of recreational sports, the duty
to refrain from acting negligently-and therefore, like contributory
negligence, bars recovery completely.17 3 The secondary assumption of
risk doctrine, like comparative negligence, relates to the allocation of
damages, not the question of duty. 174 Therefore, if a duty exists (be-
cause it is not barred by the primary assumption of the risk doctrine)
160. Id. at 970.
161. Id. at 970-71 (Verniero, J., concurring and dissenting).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 196 A.2d 238, 240-41 (N.J. 1963) (noting that any
reference to "assumption of risk" should be banished).
165. Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 584 (Cal. 2007).
166. Yoneda v. Tom, 133 P.3d 796, 808-09 (Haw. 2006).
167. Anand v. Kapoor, 15 N.Y.3d 946, 947-48 (2010).
168. Shin, 165 P.3d at 584.
169. Id.
170. Yoneda, 133 P.3d at 809.
171. Id.
172. Shin, 165 P.3d at 584.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 591.
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and that duty is breached, secondary assumption of risk merges into
comparative negligence, and the plaintiff's damages may be reduced
in proportion to the parties' respective fault.17'5
In 2008, the California Supreme Court heard Shin v. Ahn-a case
the court called the next generation of its Knight jurisprudence 76
and extended the primary assumption of risk doctrine to golf.17 7 In an
opinion by Justice Corrigan, the court held that "golfers have a limited
duty of care to other players, breached only if they intentionally injure
them or engage in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside
the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport."178
In Shin, the plaintiff, the defendant, a third golfer, and a fourth un-
identified man who left the course before the injury occurred, were
grouped together for a round of golf.179 On the thirteenth hole, the
plaintiff, while checking the messages on his cell phone, was struck in
the head by the defendant's pulled shot and permanently injured. 80
When the injury occurred, the plaintiff was twenty-five to thirty-five
feet in front of the defendant at a forty to forty-five degree angle from
the intended flight of the ball.181 The court remanded the case for the
jury to determine whether the defendant's conduct was so reckless as
to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in
golf.182
In a vehement dissent, Justice Kennard wrote that the primary as-
sumption of risk doctrine-a rule that she has stated her disagreement
with since the Knight decision in 1992-was "tearing apart the fabric
of tort law."183 She pointed out that "because the question of what is
'inherent' in a sport is amorphous and fact-intensive, it is impossible
for trial courts 'to discern, at an early stage in the proceedings, which
risks are inherent in a given sport.' "184 Thus, Justice Kennard would
have remanded the case to determine whether the defendant acted
negligently, not recklessly.18
Recently, in Anand v Kapoor, the Appellate Division of the Su-
preme Court of New York overturned a long line of negligence juris-
175. Id.
176. Id. at 582.
177. Id. at 583 (Cal. 2007).
178. Id. at 582 (quoting Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 711 (Cal. 1992)).
179. Shin v. Ahn, 141 Cal. App. 4th 726, 730 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
180. Id.
181. Shin, 165 P.3d at 583. See infra Appendix, Figure 4 for a diagram of Shin.
182. Id. at 584.
183. Id. at 593 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
184. Id. (quoting Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 723 (Cal. 1992) (Kennard, J., dissenting)).
185. Id.
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prudence in that state and applied the doctrine of primary assumption
of risk to golf.1 8 6 The court found that liability premised on a negligent
failure to warn before hitting the ball is inconsistent with the state's
modern version of primary assumption of risk.187 The New York
Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that "being hit without warning by
a shanked shot while one searches for one's own ball-reflects a com-
monly appreciated risk of golf."188
3. Rejection of the Recklessness Standard
In 1997, an Illinois Appellate court in Zurla v. Hydel stoutly re-
jected the recklessness standard and held that "a golfer injured by a
golf ball need only allege and prove traditional negligence in order to
recover for damages, rather than willful or wanton conduct."' 89 The
Zurla court exposed several shortcomings of the recklessness jurispru-
dence, including its failure to consider the customs of golf and the way
in which the sport is played, as well as the mistaken idea that injury is
inherent in golf.'90 In an opinion that displayed an intimate under-
standing of the game, the court observed:
[g]olf is simply not the type of game in which participants are inher-
ently, inevitably or customarily struck by the ball. Unlike the contact
sports recognized by the cases, the only defense of the target in golf is
made by the principles of Sir Isaac Newton, the natural obstacles of
Mother Nature and the cunning of those who have designed the
course. There is never a need for players to touch another. Rather,
golf is a sport which is contemplative and careful, with emphasis
placed on control and finesse, rather than speed or raw strength. Al-
though the game of golf certainly presents significant dangers, these
dangers are more psychological than physical. Moreover, the physical
dangers that exist are diminished by long-standing traditions in which
courtesy between the players prevails. In such an environment, play-
ers have the time to consider actions and to guard against injury to
those who may be in harms way.191
186. Anand v. Kapoor, 877 N.Y.S.2d 425; (App Div. 2009), aff'd, 942 N.E.2d 295 (N.Y. 2010).
See infra Appendix, Figure 5 for a diagram of Anand.
187. Id.
188. Id. (internal quotations omitted). See infra Appendix, Figure 5 for a diagram of Anand.
Like Thompson and Hathaway, this case could have been decided under the negligence standard
because the plaintiff was not within the zone of danger. See 877 N.Y.S.2d 425 (noting plaintiff
was fifty to eighty degrees from defendant's intended line of flight).
189. Zurla v. Hydel. 681 N.E.2d 148, 152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
190. Id. at 152.
191. Id.
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In addition, the court touched on the fact that golfers expect-and
rely on-other players to abide by the Rules:
[a] golf course is not usually considered a dangerous place, nor the
playing of golf a hazardous undertaking. It is a matter of common
knowledge that players are expected not to drive their balls without
giving warning when within hitting distance of persons in the field of
play, and that countless persons traverse golf courses the world over
in reliance on that very general expectation. 192
Another reason the Illinois court denied the recklessness standard
was because it "undermines the reasonable incentive golfers have to
guard against injuries to one another, ultimately becoming a self-fulfil-
ling prophesy."193
C. The Rules of Golf and Golf Etiquette
The Rules of Golfl 94 are written jointly19 s by the United States Golf
Association (the USGA), and Europe's R&A.196 The USGA governs
golf in the United States and Mexico, while the R&A governs golf in
126 countries throughout Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Americas.197
The latest version of the Rules is a product of more than 250 years of
drafting, and although there are some minor stylistic differences be-
tween the USGA and R&A versions, both sets of rules are essentially
the same because both organizations work "closely to produce a uni-
form code of Rules so that, wherever the game is played around the
world, the same laws apply."198
The importance of etiquette underscores both sets of rules. The
R&A notes that "[e]tiquette is an essential and inextricable part of the
game, which has come to define golf's values worldwide,"199 and that
192. Id. (quoting Everett v. Goodwin, 161 S.E. 316, 318 (N.C. 1931) (internal quotations
omitted)).
193. Id.
194. U.S. Goii Ass'N, supra note 8; Tiii R&A, Goi i Ru iIs ILLUSTRATED (2010).
195. THE R&A, http://www.randa.org/en/RandA.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2001).
196. Like the USGA, the R&A is incorporated as a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. While
its official name in its articles of incorporation is actually the R&A, the name derives from the
Royal & Ancient Golf Club of St. Andrews, Scotland-the home of golf. Sr. ANDIZi ws LINKS,
http://www.standrews.org.uk/About-Us/History.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2011); see also Si. AN-
uizinws LINKS, http://www.standrews.org.uk/About-Us/The-R-A.aspx (last visited, Feb. 21, 2011)
and THE R&A, http://www.randa.org/en/Our-Heritage.aspx (last visited, Feb. 21, 2011) for fur-
ther information regarding the relationship between the R&A, the Royal & Ancient Golf Club,
and St. Andrews.
197. THE R&A, supra note 195.
198. THE R&A, http://www.randa.org/en/Rules-and-Amateur-Status.aspx (last visited Feb. 21,
2011).
199. THE R&A, http://www.randa.org/en/Rules-and-Amateur-Status/Etiquette.aspx (last vis-
ited Feb. 21, 2011).
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"honesty, integrity, and courtesy" are the three words that represent
the spirit of the game.2 0 0 Both versions note that if proper etiquette is
observed, "all players will gain maximum enjoyment from the
game." 2 0 1 In fact, the rules of etiquette are outlined on the first page
of the Rules, which notes that "the overriding principle is that consid-
eration should be shown to others on the course at all times."2 0 2 Both
versions continue to outline "The Spirit of the Game" (a subset of golf
etiquette), which is that:
[g]olf is played, for the most part, without the supervision of a refe-
ree or umpire. The game relies on the integrity of the individual to
show consideration for other players and to abide by the Rules. All
players should conduct themselves in a disciplined manner, demon-
strating courtesy and sportsmanship at all times, irrespective of how
competitive they may be.203
Immediately following this section-and still on the first page of the
Rules-are the four, and only, rules of golf safety. These rules, which
are the core duties imposed on golfers under the negligence stan-
dard, 2 0 4 provide:
1) Players should ensure that no one is standing close by or in a
position to be hit by the club, the ball or any stones, pebbles, twigs or
the like when they make a stroke or practice swing.
2) Players should not play until the players in front of them are out
of range.
3) Players should always alert greenstaff nearby or ahead when they
are about to make a stroke that might endanger them.
4) If a player plays a ball in a direction where there is a danger of
hitting someone, he should immediately shout a warning. The tradi-
tional word of warning in such situations is "fore." 2 0 5
This Section proceeds by discussing the respective roles played by
these rules of safety in assessing liability under the negligence stan-
dard and the recklessness standard. The Discussion concludes by fur-
ther examining specific Rules violations under each standard before
200. Tin: R&A, http://www.randa.org/en/Playing-Golf/Spirit-of-the-Game.aspx (last visited
Feb. 21, 2011).
201. U.S. GOLF Ass'N, supra note 8, 1; Tiii R & A, supra note 194, at 10.
202. U.S. Goii Ass'N, supra note 8, at 1 (emphasis added); THE R & A, supra note 194, at 10
(emphasis added). Although this is technically the tenth page of the R &A version, it is still the
first page of the Rules because the R&A book begins by noting some changes to the latest
version of the Rules and provides a "Quick Guide To the Rules of Golf."
203. U.S. GOLF Ass'N, supra note 8, at 1 (emphasis added); Timn R & A, supra note 194, at 10.
204. See infra Part II.C.1 for a discussion of how the rules of golf safety are the core duties
under the negligence standard.
205. U.S. GOLF Ass'N, supra note 8, at 1 (emphasis added); accord Tiii R & A, supra note
194, at 10.
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explaining why the four rules of golf safety provide tremendous sup-
port for applying the negligence standard.
1. The Rules of Golf and Golf Etiquette Under the Negligence
Standard
The rules of golf safety are the core duties imposed on golfers under
the negligence standard: Rules one, two, and three are equivalent to
golfers' duties before the ball is hit.206 Essentially, these rules equate
to the general duty not to hit without first giving timely and adequate
warning to those in the foreseeable zone of danger.2 0 7 Rule four is
equivalent to golfers' duties after the ball is hit.2 0 8 With these rules as
the core of the standard, the negligence jurisprudence provides the
gloss. 209
It is unsurprising, therefore, that a violation of the safety rules lends
to a finding of negligence, 2 1 0 while compliance with the safety rules is
persuasive evidence that no duty was breached.2 1 1 However, compli-
ance with (or violation of) the Rules does not establish per se reasona-
bleness (or unreasonableness). 212 Ultimately, the negligence analysis
comes down to "what a reasonable person would have done under the
circumstances." 213
2. The Rules of Golf and Golf Etiquette Under the Recklessness
Standard
Like the negligence analysis, the Rules under the recklessness stan-
dard are not dispositive in assessing liability. 214 However, recklessness
courts seem to give less deference, unsurprisingly, to the Rules than
206. Compare the rules of golf safety, supra note 205, with golfers' duties before the ball is hit
under the negligence standard, supra Part II.A. 1i.
207. See supra Part II.A.1.i for a discussion of golfers' general duty to give timely and ade-
quate warning to individuals in the foreseeable zone of danger under the negligence standard.
208. Compare the rules of golf safety, supra note 205, with golfers' duties after the ball is hit
under the negligence standard, supra notes 92-95.
209. For example, the negligence jurisprudence outlines approaches for determining the fore-
seeable zone of danger, supra Part II.A.1.ii, and makes exceptions to the general duties to warn
before hitting, supra Part II.A.iii, and after hitting, supra Part II.A.2.ii.
210. See, e.g., Getz v. Freed, 105 A.2d 102, 103-04 (Pa. 1954) (noting that defendant was negli-
gent when he failed to warn of his intention to hit an unannounced mulligan).
211. See, e.g., Cavin v. Kasser, 820 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that defen-
dant had no duty to warn of his intention to play because no evidence existed that he "disre-
garded any rule or custom of the game").
212. See, e.g., Thomas v. Wheat, 143 P.3d 767, 771 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006).
213. Id.
214. Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 590 (Cal. 2007) (noting that a violation of the Rules does not
establish liability per se); Schick v. Ferolito, 767 A.2d 962, 969 (N.J. 2001) (noting that a violation
of the Rules "should not compel a determination of recklessness").
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negligence courts. For example, the California Court of Appeals in
Dilger v. Moyles noted that "golf etiquette does not necessarily rise to
the level of a duty." 2 15 Similarly, the Shin court noted that "the sanc-
tion for a violation of a rule of etiquette [or a rule of safety] is social
disapproval, not legal liability." 216
3. Specific Rule Violations Under Both Standards
i. Failure to Give Warning
While it is well established that a failure to yell "fore" or give other
timely warning-both before and after the ball is hit-to those in the
foreseeable zone of danger is a breach of the duty to use ordinary
care, 217 it is unclear when such a failure will rise to the level of reck-
lessness. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court remanded the
Schick case to determine whether the defendant's failure to allow the
plaintiff to move out of the "line of fire" after acknowledging his pres-
ence and giving him a warning constituted recklessness.2 18 Justice
Verniero, in a dissenting and concurring opinion, argued that this con-
duct was not reckless as a matter of law and, therefore, summary judg-
ment should have been awarded for the defendant.219
Part of this uncertainty arises because some recklessness courts fo-
cus their analysis on the intended line of flight rather than the foresee-
able zone of danger.22 0 The Ohio Supreme Court, the first to adopt
the recklessness standard for golf, noted that a golfer's failure to yell
"fore" when he knows another individual is within the intended line of
flight "could amount to reckless indifference to the rights of
others." 2 2 1 A California appellate court in Dilger v. Moyles broadly
held that a failure to warn is not reckless because it "does not alter the
inherent risk of the sport-being struck by a golf ball," 2 2 2 but the ex-
tent of this holding is uncertain because the defendant could not see
the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was not within the intended line of
215. Dilger v. Moyles, 54 Cal. App. 4th 1452, 1455 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
216. Shin, 165 P.3d at 590.
217. See supra Parts II.A.1.i and II.A.2.i for a discussion of the duty to give timely and ade-
quate warning under the negligence standard before and after hitting, respectively.
218. Schick, 767 A.2d at 970.
219. Id. at 971.
220. See, e.g., Pfenning v. Lineman, 922 N.E. 2d 45, 53-54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a
failure to warn was not reckless because the plaintiff was not within the intended line of flight
and the defendant could not see the plaintiff); Gray v. Giroux, 730 N.E.2d 338, 341 (Mass. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding that a failure to warn was not reckless when plaintiff was not within the
intended line of flight, and defendant did not see plaintiff).
221. Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705, 707 (Ohio 1990).
222. Dilger v. Moyles, 54 Cal. App. 4th 1452, 1455 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
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flight. 223 Although it is not entirely clear when a failure to warn will
constitute recklessness, such an omission is less likely to give rise to
liability under the recklessness standard-by virtue of its lower stan-
dard of care-than under the negligence standard.2 2 4
ii. Unannounced Mulligans
A mulligan is a shot taken when a golfer gets permission to take a
replacement shot.22 5 It is essentially a "do-over" that a golfer might
feel inclined to take if unsatisfied with his original shot. Unlike a pro-
visional shot,226 which requires a golfer to take a penalty and is there-
fore allowed by the Rules, a mulligan-because it results in no
penalty-is prohibited by the Rules.2 2 7 At first glance, mulligans seem
to present a somewhat dicey issue because although they are prohib-
ited by the Rules, 22 8 they are often customary in informal games. 2 2 9
Indeed, every member of the threesome in Anand took a "breakfast
223. Id. at 1453-54.
224. See e.g., id. at 1456 (noting that defendant's failure to warn was possibly negligent, but
not reckless); see also Ian M. Burnstein, Liability for Injuries Suffered in the Course of Recrea-
tional Sports: Application of the Negligence Standard, 71 U. DET. MFRCy L. REv. 993, 1020-21
(1994) (noting that "courts which adopt the recklessness standard are... prone to deny recovery
for rule violations. .. . In contrast, courts which apply the negligence standard are more apt to
provide the plaintiff recovery for a blatant rule violation").
225. A mulligan is "[p]ermission by a player (forbidden under the rules) to an opponent to
replay a mis-played shot, especially a tee-shot." DAVIHS, supra note 3, at 56. Colloquially, "mulli-
gan" also refers to the actual shot that is taken after permission is granted.
226. A provisional shot is taken by a golfer when a ball is lost or out of bounds. U.S. GOLF
Ass'N, supra note 8, at 80-81 (Rule 27). The Schick court noted the strict requirements surround-
ing the announcement of an intention to hit a provisional ball:
[T]he formal rules of the game allow for the taking of a second, or "provisional shot," if certain
conditions are met. The rules prescribe a strict form of notice to one's playing partners of intent
to take a provisional shot. Decisions on the Rules of Golf prescribe that the player must inform
his opponent or fellow player that he intends to play a provisional ball and he must mention the
words "provisional ball." The following statements have been ruled not to satisfy the require-
ment of announcing a provisional ball: "That might be lost, I am going to re-load." "I'd better hit
another one."
Schick v. Ferolito, 767 A.2d at 969 (internal citations omitted).
227. See U.S. GOLF Ass'N, supra note 8, at 19 (Rule 1-3 prohibits players from agreeing to
"exclude the operation of any Rule or to waive any penalty incurred").
228. Unlike a failure to yell "fore," mulligans are not a violation of the Rules of Golf Safety,
but are rather a violation of the camp of rules designed to enhance competition. Nonetheless,
because they are not within the Rules, they are less foreseeable.
229. Schick, 767 A.2d at 969 (noting that "[a]lthough the formal rules of golf do not recognize
the term 'mulligan,' informal custom may permit that familiar 'do-over'"). Usually, however, it is
appropriate to ask for permission-or at least announce that you have given yourself permis-
sion-before hitting a mulligan. See GoG Rowi y, Goi, NAKHD: TiiiH BARI ESiNiIALS Ri-
VEALED 124 (2009) (noting that a golfer on the first tee should always ask for permission to hit a
mulligan even before hitting his first shot).
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ball" 2 30 off the first tee without controversy. 231 And "mulligan" is so
ubiquitous in common parlance that Justice Verniero even suggested
that the New Jersey Supreme Court could take judicial notice of the
term.232
As with cases involving a failure to warn, whether injury is caused
by an unannounced mulligan is not dispositive of liability under either
standard, but merely a factor to consider.233 While the circumstances
under which the taking of unannounced mulligans will rise to the level
of recklessness are uncertain, negligence courts have the advantage of
considering these issues under the foreseeable zone of danger analy-
sis, commensurate with ordinary care. 2 3 4 In Part III, this Comment
discusses the advantages of a uniform implementation of the negli-
gence standard.
III. DISCUSSION
Future courts should reject the current trend and reaffirm the negli-
gence standard as the appropriate standard for golf. The rationales
for the recklessness standard-a standard that has its roots in sports
where physical contact is the norm235-simply do not hold up when
230. A breakfast ball is a mulligan taken off the first tee. See id. at 124 (noting that a mulligan
is "also called a breakfast ball, brunch ball, or lunch ball" depending on the time of day). For
further information about breakfast balls, see also Alistair Tait, Breakfast Ball? Are you Kidding
me, GOLF WEEK (Nov. 7, 2009), available at http://www.golfweek.com/news/2009/nov/07/break-
fast-ball-are-you-kidding-me.
231. Anand v. Kapoor, 877 N.Y.S.2d 425 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
232. Schick, 767 A.2d at 973 (Verniero, J., concurring and dissenting).
233. Id. at 970 (noting that whether defendant's shot was an unannounced mulligan was not
dispositive of liability, but rather the full circumstances around the shot needed to be considered
to determine recklessness). In Allen v. Donath, 875 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994), neither
party disputed that the defendant had a duty to warn of his intention to hit a mulligan, but the
jury did not find that a failure to do so constituted recklessness. While still not dispositive of
liability, negligence courts seem to have less sympathy for the golfer who injures another as a
result of an announced mulligan. See Getz v. Freed, 105 A.2d 102, 103 (Pa. 1954) (noting
"[d]efendant was undoubtedly guilty of negligence in driving a third ball when his second drive
was in the fairway"). Indeed, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that "all golfers know" it
is negligent for a golfer to take an unannounced mulligan when his prior drive is in play. Id.
Furthermore, the fact that mulligans might be customary does not mean that they are consistent
with ordinary care. As the Supreme Court of North Carolina noted:
Since negligence is the failure to do that which an ordinarily prudent man would do, or the doing
of that which an ordinarily prudent man would not do, under the same circumstances, an ordi-
nary custom, while relevant and admissible in evidence on the issue of negligence, is not conclu-
sive, especially where the custom is clearly a careless or dangerous one.
McWilliams v. Parham, 160 S.E.2d 692, 696 (N.C. 1968).
234. See supra Part II.A.1.i for a discussion of the point that ordinary care imposes a duty on
golfers to warn individuals in the foreseeable zone of danger of an intention to hit.
235. See Schick, 767 A.2d at 968 (noting that the recklessness standard is the standard in New
Jersey for recreational sports generally and extending this rule to golf); Thompson v. McNeill,
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applied to golf. 2 3 6 Occupying an uncertain penumbra between negli-
gence and intent, recklessness is a nebulous standard incapable of be-
ing applied consistently.237 In stark contrast, the negligence standard
is the appropriate approach because it conforms to the well-estab-
lished Rules of Golf.2 3 8 As a result, the negligence standard provides
courts and golfers with a clearly defined standard of care, 239 is in
keeping with the spirit of the game,240 is consistent with golfers' rea-
sonable expectations,241 and is consistent with the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.242 Moreover, this standard merely ask golfers to act
reasonably 243-a flexible and commonsense approach that courts and
juries have great experience in applying-so that severely injured
plaintiffs are not forced to bear the costs of preventable injuries
caused by negligent conduct.244
Section III.A of this discussion explains why the recklessness stan-
dard is inappropriate for golf. First, Section III.A.1. explains why the
rationales for the recklessness standard, although sensible in other
sports, do not swing on the course. Next, Section III.A.2 points out
some problems with the recklessness standard more generally. After
putting the recklessness standard back in the bag, Section JJJ.B ex-
plains why the negligence standard is the appropriate approach. Sec-
tion III.C addresses critics by refuting potential objections to the
559 N.E.2d 705, 707 (Ohio 1990) (adopting the recklessness standard after it was first announced
in Hanson v. Kynast, 526 N.E.2d 327 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987), which involved a Division 1 college
lacrosse game).
236. See infra Part III.A.1 for an analysis of the rationales for the recklessness standard in
recreational sports and the argument that they do not hold up when applied to the more genteel
game of golf.
237. See infra Part III.A.2 for a discussion of the nebulous nature of the recklessness standard
and the argument that it is impossible for courts and juries to apply consistently.
238. See supra Part II.C.1 for an analysis of the conformity between the Rules of Golf and the
negligence standard.
239. See infra Part II1.B.1.i for a discussion of the argument that the negligence standard,
because it conforms to the Rules of Golf, provides courts and golfers with a clearly defined
standard of care.
240. See infra Part III.B.1.ii for a discussion of the argument that the negligence standard,
because it conforms to the Rules of Golf, is consistent with the long-standing traditions of golf
and the spirit of the game.
241. See infra Part III.B.1.iii for a discussion of the argument that the negligence standard,
because it conforms to the Rules of Golf, is consistent with golfers' reasonable expectations.
242. See infra Part 111.B.1.iv for a discussion of the argument that the negligence standard,
because it conforms to the Rules of Golf, is consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
243. See supra Part III.B.2 for an analysis of the argument that the negligence standard is the
appropriate approach because it merely asks golfers to act reasonably-a flexible and common-
sense standard that courts and juries have great experience in applying.
244. See infra notes 292-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the argument that the
negligence standard, unlike the recklessness standard, does not force negligently injured plain-
tiffs to bear the costs of preventable injuries.
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negligence standard. Finally, Section JI.D provides a few suggestions
for future courts applying the negligence standard, and Section III.E
provides a few suggestions for courts that insist on applying the reck-
lessness standard.
A. The Recklessness Standard is Inappropriate for Golf
1. The Rationales for the Recklessness Standard Fail when Applied
to Golf
The primary rationales for the recklessness standard in recreational
sports are: (1) the promotion of participation in recreational sports,
(2) the desire not to chill conduct that straddles the borderlines of the
rules, (3) the avoidance of excessive litigation, (4) consistency among
recreational sports, (5) the difficulty in ascertaining what might be
reasonable care on a case-by-case basis, and (6) the conclusion that
injury is an inherent risk of sports that all athletes assume by partici-
pating.245 Although sensible in other recreational sports, these ratio-
nales fail when applied to golf.2 4 6
The first rationale-so the argument goes-is that by decreasing the
potential for legal liability, the recklessness standard promotes partici-
pation in recreational sports.247 While this makes sense in contact
sports like lacrosse, 248 it iS unpersuasive when applied to golf. In fact,
quite the opposite conclusion could reasonably be drawn: many golf-
ers are likely to be discouraged from playing due to concerns of being
negligently injured without compensation. 2 4 9 Consider a reasonable
245. See supra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of the rationales behind applying the recklessness
standard to recreational sports.
246. This has been pointed out in an excellent law review article by Daniel E. Lazaroff, Pro-
fessor of Law and Economics at Loyola University-Los Angeles and Director of the Loyola
Sports Law Institute. Daniel E. Lazaroff, Golfer's Tort Liability-A Critique of an Emerging
Standard, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 317, 329 (2002). Unfortunately, however, courts in
the last decade have continued to miss this point and continue to obstinately opt for the reckless-
ness standard over the negligence approach. See supra Part 11.2 for a discussion of the recent
trend of applying the recklessness standard to golf.
247. See supra note 126 and accompanying text for a discussion of the argument that the
recklessness standard promotes participation in recreational sports.
248. In the context of recreational sports, the recklessness standard in Ohio-the first state to
the adopt the recklessness standard for golf-was first announced in a Division college 1 lacrosse
game. Hanson v. Kynast, 526 N.E.2d 327 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987). See also Lazaroff, supra note 246,
at 329 (arguing that is makes sense to apply a recklessness standard in sports such as boxing,
kickboxing, full contact karate, ice hockey, and football because the physical nature of these
sports makes it impossible for participants to use reasonable care).
249. See Recent Case, Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581 (Cal. 2007), 121 HARv. L. REv. 1253, 1259
(2008) (arguing that "[a]lthough some recreational athletes may be emboldened by the tort pro-
tections they enjoy, others might shy away from vigorous participation in sports, out of fear of
absorbing the burden of nonremediable, nonreckless injuries").
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golfer's cost-benefit analysis under both standards. Under the negli-
gence standard, the costs are low: golfers have a duty to act reasona-
bly, which essentially means following the four rules of golf safety.250
The benefits are great: if a golfer becomes endangered by a wayward
golf ball-an object capable of causing a loss of consciousness, vision,
or life-the standard requires that the golfer be given a warning so as
to have a chance of avoiding injury.251
Now, consider the recklessness standard. Although the minimal (or
practically nonexistent) costs associated with giving warning are re-
duced, the overall benefits of playing golf are likewise reduced be-
cause the golf course becomes less safe.2 52 The increased hazards
created by the recklessness standard compromise the peace of mind
golfers seek on the course. 2 5 3 Furthermore, because the recklessness
standard produces an environment where golfers cannot expect to rely
on fellow participants for a warning, players are forced to divert atten-
tion from enjoying the game to protecting themselves from negligent
injurers. A comparison of these two analyses suggests that a reasona-
ble golfer would rather hit the links in a state that follows the negli-
gence standard as opposed to the recklessness standard. And even if
an unreasonable golfer prefers the recklessness standard, that is not
the type of golfer whose behavior should be encouraged on the
course. 254
The second rationale-that chilling borderline prescribed and pro-
hibited conduct would fundamentally alter the sport2 55-also fails to
have the same force in golf that it does in other sports. Unlike ice
hockey or football, for example, where an athlete gains a competitive
250. See supra Part II.C.1 for a discussion of the point that the four rules of golf safety are the
core duties imposed under the negligence standard.
251. See supra Parts II.A.1.i and II.A.1.2.i for a discussion of the duties to warn under the
negligence standard before and after the ball is hit, respectively.
252. See supra Part II.C.3.i for a discussion of the point that the recklessness standard often
shields golfers from liability under the recklessness standard.
253. Indeed, the reckless jurisprudence supports this point. See supra note 127 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the psychological benefits that golfers seek by engaging in the
sport.
254. Cf Lazaroff, supra note 246, at 333-34 (arguing that under the negligence standard, the
"only behavior that would be 'chilled' would be undesirable conduct that is not inherent in golf
and is antithetical to its rules, customs, and traditions"). This Comment does not argue that bad
golfers should be discouraged from playing golf; golfers of all skill levels should hit the links.
What this Comment does argue is that unreasonable behavior on the golf course should not be
immunized from liability. See infra Part III.C.1 for a discussion of the argument that the negli-
gence standard is not too harsh on bad golfers.
255. See supra note 125 and accompanying text for a discussion of the argument that the
recklessness standard is preferred over the negligence standard because it does not chill border-
line prohibited and prescribed conduct in sports.
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advantage by playing aggressively-and thus aggressive play is a fun-
damental part of the sport-a golfer gains no competitive advantage
by playing aggressively. 256 Prohibiting borderline conduct would thus
not fundamentally alter the nature of golf. 2 57 Indeed,
[t]here can be no serious argument that waiting to make a stroke
until others are out of range of the club or ball inhibits anything in the
inherent nature of the sport. Further, shouting a warning of "fore" or
signaling with a wave when a shot goes astray is also something that
golfers can easily do without detracting from the competition. At-
tempting to protect other players within the "zone of danger" would
not alter the competition.258
Similarly, unlike other sports in which there is little or no time to
consider one's actions, golf is "contemplative and careful, with empha-
sis placed on control and finesse, rather than speed or raw
strength." 259 The golf course is an environment where "players have
the time to consider the consequences of their actions and to guard
against injury to those who may be in harms [sic] way." 260 Accord-
ingly, a negligence standard would not fundamentally alter the sport,
and the recklessness standard is unnecessary.
The third rationale-the avoidance of excessive litigation261-iS
well-intentioned, but also off the mark. Presumably, the theory be-
hind this rationale is that the recklessness standard will produce less
litigation because the standard is more difficult to satisfy. But as
Zurla v. Hydel pointed out, the recklessness standard may decrease
incentives to use ordinary care, thereby making the golf course a more
dangerous place. 262 According to the Zurla court, more injuries-and
thus more litigation-are likely to result in a self-fulfilling
prophecy. 263
While perhaps overstated, this argument is persuasive in light of re-
cent media coverage surrounding Anand v. Kapoor.26 4 Recent head-
lines-which include "Golfing shankers told there is no need for
'Fore!,"' "If You Yell 'Fore' on a Golf Course, Are You Wasting Your
256. See Lazaroff, supra note 246, at 331.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Zurla v. Hydel, 681 N.E.2d 148, 152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
260. Id.
261. See supra note 126 and accompanying text for a discussion of the argument that the
recklessness standard avoids excessive litigation.
262. Zura, 681 N.E.2d at 152 (111. App. Ct. 1997); see also Lazaroff, supra note 246, at 331 ("If
golfers know that they may be held liable for careless behavior, there will be a greater incentive
to behave accordingly").
263. Zurla, 681 N.E.2d at 152.
264. Anand v. Kapoor, 877 N.Y.S.2d 425 (App. Div. 2009), aff'd, 942 N.E.2d 295 (N.Y. 2010).
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Breath?," and "Court: Shanked shots an expected risk"-suggest that
the recklessness standard encourages unreasonable behavior.265 On a
more fundamental level, even if the recklessness standard actually
does decrease the amount of golf-related litigation, it does not follow
that this goal justifies depriving negligently injured plaintiffs of
remedies. 266
The fourth rationale-the preference for consistency among recrea-
tional sports267-is even more dubious.268 The court in Schick v. Fer-
olito argued that different standards would "lead to confusion among
potential litigants." 269 To take this argument seriously, however, one
must believe that the current state of the law leaves litigants so hope-
lessly confused that depriving negligently injured golfers of fair com-
pensation should be made secondary to the goal of having one
uniform standard of care for the entire universe of recreational sports
(which is a misguided goal in the first place because there are great
disparities in risk, level of physical contact, customs, ability to prevent
harm, and the like among different recreational sports). Likewise, it is
far from unreasonable to ask lawyers to research the standard of care
before filing a lawsuit; it would be unreasonable to expect the oppo-
site. And even in jurisdictions where the standard for all recreational
sports is recklessness, defining reckless conduct still turns on the con-
text of the sport, 2 7 0 so some amount of inconsistency is therefore
inevitable.
The fifth rationale-the supposed difficulty of ascertaining reasona-
ble conduct on a case-by-case basis271-iS perhaps the most mistaken
of all. The rules of golf safety, which courts can easily refer to, clearly
265. See supra note 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the recent media coverage
surrounding Anand.
266. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of courts in
determining policy. See Burnstein, supra note 224, at 1021 (arguing that "it is unjustifiable to
discriminate against [those who have been injured as a result of negligence] in order to prevent
the increase in litigation").
267. See supra note 130 and accompanying text for a discussion of the argument for consis-
tency among all recreational sports.
268. See Lazaroff, supra note 267, at 329 (arguing that "maintaining consistency among all
sports tort cases may simplify matters, but it does not necessarily reflect sound public policy").
269. Schick v. Ferolito, 767 A.2d 962, 968 (N.J. 2001).
270. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the point that defining
reckless conduct turns on the context of the sport.
271. See supra note 129 and accompanying text for a discussion of the argument that the
recklessness standard avoids the problem of defining objectively reasonable conduct on a case-
by-case basis.
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demarcate reasonable and unreasonable conduct.272 If, for some rea-
son, the Rules are not dispositive in a given situation, courts can easily
fall back on the objective standard of ordinary care in light of a con-
sideration of the totality of the circumstances. 2 7 3 The courts have at
their disposal a rich history of negligence jurisprudence-both on and
off the golf course274-to enable them to do this effectively. 275 Fur-
thermore, if determining what is reasonable is difficult on a case-by-
case basis, then merely making the standard more difficult for plain-
tiffs to satisfy-and more difficult for courts and juries to apply2 7 6
fails to solve this problem because a determination of what is reckless
still requires a determination of what is reasonable. 277
The sixth rationale-that injury is inherent in sport and therefore
all athletes assume the risk of negligence 278-iS unpersuasive in the
genteel game of golf. Although the occasional golf injury might be
unavoidable, "golf is simply not the type of game in which participants
are inherently ... or customarily struck by the ball." 2 7 9 If golf was
such a game, it would indeed be quite strange that so much business
occurs on the golf course. 280
272. See infra Part II.B.1.i for an analysis of how the Rules of Golf-which are readily accessi-
ble and anchored in common sense-provide courts and golfers with a clearly defined standard
of care.
273. See supra Part II.C. 1. for a discussion of the point that the standard of ordinary care is a
safeguard to ensure a sensible result in golf-related litigation.
274. Erica K. Rosenthal, Note, Inside the Lines: Basing Negligence Liability in Sports For
Safety-Based Rule Violations on the Level of Play, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 2631, 2634 (2004) (noting
that the negligence standard is the most common standard for assessing liability in modern tort
law).
275. See supra Part II.A.1 for a discussion of a century of golf jurisprudence under the negli-
gence standard. See infra Part III.B.2. for a further discussion of the argument that the negli-
gence standard is a flexible and commonsense approach that courts and juries can apply
effectively.
276. See supra notes 281-87, 357 for a discussion of difficulties surrounding the recklessness
standard.
277. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the point that a deter-
mination of what is reckless depends on a determination of what is reasonable.
278. See supra note 131 and accompanying text for a discussion of the argument that injury is
inherent in all sporting activity and therefore participants should be shielded from liability for
negligent injuries.
279. Zurla v. Hydel, 681 N.E.2d 148, 152 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
280. See, e.g., Will Buckley, Mega business finds the rough when forging links with Scotland:
Playing golf and making money both come easy to New York's Mr. Popular, GITARDIAN.CO.UK
(Nov. 11, 2007), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2007/nov/11/golf.news. Donald
Trump notes that he has executed many business deals on the golf course, partly because he
thinks he can learn a lot about a person by playing golf with him. Id. Interestingly, perhaps some
of the laws from this country's highest court were contemplated on the golf course. See generally,
Ross E. Davies, The Ancient and Judicial Game: James Wilson, John Marshall Harlan, and the
Beginnings of Golf at the Supreme Court, 35 J. Sup. CT. HisT. (forthcoming 2010) (providing a
history of golf and the Supreme Court).
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2. Other problems with the Recklessness Standard
There are at least three other reasons why the recklessness standard
should be kept off the course. First, recklessness is a nebulous stan-
dard. 281 Different courts use different formulas for defining reckless-
ness, leading to further confusion.282 The result is that the recklessness
jurisprudence is a mess. 2 8 3 In golf, the contours of recklessness are
amorphous. 2 8 4 An absence of clarity makes it difficult for courts to
determine whether to dismiss a case or allow it to proceed to a jury.2 8 5
This difficulty has surfaced in the case law. The justices in Schick-
able jurists, indeed-could not reach a unanimous decision on
whether the case should have been dismissed or remanded to the
jury.286 The troubled state of the recklessness jurisprudence leaves
golfers and courts to guess what constitutes actionable conduct-the
very problem that the recklessness courts sought to remedy. 287
A second-and even more troubling-problem is that the reckless-
ness standard seems to forget that the primary purpose of tort law is
compensation, not punishment.288 The recklessness standard allows
281. See generally Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, The Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 WASH U. L.
Riv. 111 (2008). Rapp notes that "recklessness has remained one of the murkiest standards in
tort. It has rarely been the subject of academic analysis. In the courts, the definition of reckless-
ness has remained elusive." Id. at 114-15. Rapp also considers several cases dealing with errant
golf shots to show the difficulties courts have with determining whether certain conduct consti-
tutes recklessness. Id. at 145-46. Rapp suggests that because the Third Restatement-unlike the
First and Second Restatements-considers risk in relation to the cost of avoidance, courts may
be more likely to find conduct reckless on the golf course in the future. Id. However, he notes
that this is one of the more controversial provisions in the Third Restatement, and it is unclear
whether courts will accept this analysis. Id. at 144.
282. Burnstein, supra note 224, at 1013; Rapp, supra note 281, at 135 (noting that the inconsis-
tent approaches at defining recklessness have created confusion and unpredictability).
283. See supra note 281 for a discussion of the mess surrounding recklessness.
284. See supra notes 223-30 and accompanying text for the ambiguity surrounding whether a
failure to warn constitutes recklessness.
285. See supra notes 223-30 and accompanying text for the ambiguity surrounding failure to
warn cases under the recklessness standard. Justice Kennard pointed out the difficulty in deter-
mining what conduct constitutes recklessness in her dissent in Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 593
(Cal. 2007) (Kennard, J., dissenting) (noting that "because the question of what is 'inherent' in a
sport is amorphous and fact-intensive, it is impossible for trial courts 'to discern, at an early stage
in the proceedings, which risks are inherent in a given sport"). See supra notes 183-85 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of Justice Kennard's dissent.
286. Schick v. Ferolito, 767 A.2d 962 (N.J. 2001).
287. Id. at 965 (N.J. 2001) (arguing for the recklessness standard because "a legal duty of care,
based on the standard of what, objectively, an average reasonable person would do under the
circumstances is illusory, and is not susceptible to sound and consistent application on a case-by-
case basis").
288. As Prosser & Keaton note:
[While the purpose of the criminal law is] to protect and vindicate the interests of the public as a
whole, by punishing ... the offender
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plaintiffs to recover only in cases in which punitive-and not merely
compensatory-damages may be awarded. 2 8 9 This all-or-nothing ap-
proach implies that plaintiffs should be compensated only when a de-
fendant's conduct was such an extreme departure from social norms
that it is worthy of punishment.290 This approach misses the point of
tort law and is therefore bad policy.291
A third-and equally troubling-problem with the recklessness
standard is that it shifts costs from negligent actors to innocent vic-
tims. 2 9 2 This policy decision-which expresses a preference to leave
severely injured plaintiffs uncompensated rather than to ask partici-
pants to act reasonably-deserves serious reconsideration. One goal
of tort law, known as the "insurance rationale," is to spread risk
throughout society so that costs are not strictly borne by innocent
The civil action in tort, on the other hand, is commenced and maintained by the injured person,
and its primary purpose is to compensate the damage suffered, at the expense of the wrongdoer.
WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., supra note 42, § 2, at 7 (citing C.S. KENNY, OU TLINES OF CRIMINAL
LAw (15th. ed. 1936)). Rapp, supra note 281, at 179 ("Tort law is not about punishment. Tort law
is about assigning financial responsibility for injuries").
Although punishment may be one purpose of tort law, it is clear that it is a peripheral purpose
compared to compensation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs 901, which notes the pur-
poses of the law of torts: "(a) to give compensation, indemnity or restitution for harms; (b) to
determine rights; (c) to punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct; and (d) to vindicate
parties to deter retaliation or violent and unlawful self-help."
289. See WILLIAM L. PRoSSIR I AL., Supra note 42, § 34, at 213 (noting that reckless conduct
may justify an award of punitive damages); see also Schick, 767 A.2d at 975 (arguing that sum-
mary judgment should have been awarded for the defendant because the court's disposition
"exposes this and similarly-situated defendants to the possibility of punitive damages").
290. See WILLIAM L. PiRoSSil IFT AL., Supra note 42, § 2, at 9 (noting punitive damages "are
given to the plaintiff over and above the full compensation for the injuries, for the purpose of
punishing the defendant, of teaching the defendant not to do it again, and of deterring others
from following the defendant's example").
291. Concededly, an argument of this sort could potentially be made about any liability
scheme in which negligence does not provide a cause of action. But denying compensation for
negligent harm is appropriate only when social policy trades off compensation for some more
important goal. See Ray Yasser, Perspective: In the Heat of Competition: Tort Liability of One
Participant to Another: Why Can't Participants be Required to be Reasonable?, 5 SETON HALL J.
SvoRIus L. 253, 270 (1995) ("In a few limited areas, actors are insulated from liability for ordinary
negligence. These exemptions ... are rooted in policy.") An example is defamation law, where
reckless disregard to the truth or intentional falsity is required to sustain a cause of action. Id. at
270-71. This policy decision is grounded in the fact that "we are a people deeply committed to
free speech and a wide-open, robust discussion of issues of public concern. In order to give
speech the breathing room it needs to thrive, negligent speakers are insulated from liability." Id.
Unlike free speech-which goes to the heart of the Constitution-there is no equivalent justifi-
cation for providing "breathing room" for negligent golf. Cf id. at 271-72 (arguing that sports,
unlike free speech, do not require "breathing room" so as to shield negligent actors from
liability).
292. See Recent Case, supra note 249, at 1259 ("[I]n protecting sports-related injurers, [the
recklessness standard] expos[es] sport injury victims to the risk of bearing the full costs of harms
inflicted on them by nonreckless fellow participants").
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plaintiffs. 293 It makes little sense to saddle innocent plaintiffs with the
costs of severe injuries if they can be paid for by the negligent actor or
the negligent actor's insurance. 2 94
Because the recklessness standard is not only based on rationales
that fail when applied to golf, but is also plagued with a host of other
deficiencies, an alternative approach is necessary. Fortunately, the
negligence standard provides the solution.
B. The Negligence Standard is the Appropriate Approach
The negligence standard is the appropriate approach because it con-
forms to the well-established Rules of Golf.2 9 5 As a result, the negli-
gence standard provides golfers and courts with a clearly defined
standard of care, 2 9 6 is in keeping with the spirit of the game, 2 9 7 is con-
sistent with golfers' reasonable expectations, 2 9 8 and is consistent with
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.2 9 9 Moreover, this standard merely
293. One commentator noted:
[T]he ability of defendants to spread the costs of plaintiffs' accidents has come to be regarded as
one of the great benefits of the tort system, and indeed one of the leading reasons for imposing
liability. This is what I call the 'insurance rationale' for tort liability-the idea that some defend-
ants ought to be assessed with liability, in part because of their ability to insure and spread the
loss.
MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING A(C(IDENT COSTS: INSURANCE, LIABILITY, AND TORT REFORM
1 (1995).
294. Generally, liability insurance contracts include express provisions that either require that
an injury be "accidental" or preclude coverage for intended results. ROBERT W. KEATON &
Ai AN I. WmiISs, INSURANCi LAw: A Gum: To) FUNDAMHNIAl PRINCI ii s, L(Al DocI izNs,
AND COMMERICAL PRACTICES § 5.4(a), 498 (1988). "The term 'accidental' is broader than the
term 'negligence' and thus includes negligence." Safeco Ins. Co v. Robert S., 28 P.3d 889, 894
(Cal. 2001) (internal citations omitted). Liability insurance generally also provides coverage for
reckless conduct so long as the insurance contract does not include an exclusionary provision. Cf
id. at 893-94 (finding that the insurer would need to include an exclusionary provision in the
insurance contract to exonerate itself from coverage of gross negligence). One issue that the
courts are split on is whether-in the absence of an exclusionary provision-liability insurance
does or should provide coverage for punitive damages that the insured is ordered to pay. See
KiATON T 1. AL., INSU RANCi LAw § 5.3(g), at 494-97. Some jurisdictions have created ajudicially
imposed public policy exception that liability insurance does not cover punitive damages. Id. at
495. However, in many of these jurisdictions, the exception only applies when punitive damages
are awarded for intentional-and not merely reckless-conduct. Id.
295. See supra Part II.C.1 for an analysis of how the negligence standard conforms to the
Rules of Golf.
296. See infra Part III.B.1.i for an analysis of how the negligence standard, because it con-
forms to the Rules of Golf, provides courts and golfers with a clearly defined standard of care.
297. See infra Part III.B.1.ii for an analysis of how the negligence standard, because it con-
forms to the Rules of Golf, is consistent with the long-standing traditions of golf and the spirit of
the game.
298. See infra Part III.B.1.iii for an analysis of how the negligence standard, because it con-
forms to the Rules of Golf, is consistent with golfers' reasonable expectations.
299. See infra Part 11I.B.1.iv for an analysis of how the negligence standard, because it con-
forms to the Rules of Golf, is consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
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asks golfers to act reasonably-a flexible and commonsense approach
that courts and juries have great experience in applying.300 This Sec-
tion makes each of these arguments in turn.
1. The Negligence Standard Conforms to the Well-Established Rules
of Golf
i. The Negligence Standard Provides Courts and Golfers with a
Clearly Defined Standard of Care
Because it conforms to the four rules of golf safety,30 1 the negli-
gence standard provides courts and golfers with a clearly defined basis
for determining the relevant standard of care. This approach has great
appeal because the Rules are widely disseminated and anchored in
common sense.302
The USGA goes out of its way to make the Rules easily accessible
for golfers of all skill levels. The rules of safety are placed prominently
in the Rule Book, on the first page. 303 Every member of the USGA is
provided with a copy of the Rule Book upon receipt of yearly dues.304
Dues are only ten dollars, and anyone is welcome to join.305 Exper-
ienced golfers tend to know the Rule; as the Seventh Circuit re-
marked, "The official 'Rules of Golf' by the USGA (and the Royal
and Ancient Golf Club of St. Andrews, Scotland) is a staple in the bag
of all true golfers." 306
But it is not even necessary to be a true golfer or a member of the
USGA (or even a golfer at all) to access the Rules-they can be ac-
cessed for free online. 07 Moreover, it is common for private golf clubs
to have copies available at no cost, while public courses generally have
them available for sale.308 In addition, golfers can actually call the
USGA-even during a round of golf-to resolve Rules disputes over
300. See infra Part 111.B.2 for a discussion of how the negligence standard merely asks golfers
to act reasonably-a flexible and commonsense approach that can be followed by golfers and
accurately assessed by courts and juries.
301. See supra Part II.C.1 for an analysis of how the negligence standard conforms to the rules
of golf safety.
302. Furthermore, the Rules are made by those in the best position to understand the game
and define appropriate conduct. See Rosenthal, supra note 274, at 2673.
303. U.S. Goiwi Ass'N, supra note 295, at 1.
304. Interview with Joseph W. Anthony, Former General Counsel of the USGA (2009-10)
(Feb. 16, 2011).
305. Id.
306. Olinger v. U.S. Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1002 (7th Cir. 2000). The Former General
Counsel of the USGA also noted that "every golfer I know who is serious about the game has a
copy of the rule book in his bag." Interview with Joseph W. Anthony, supra note 304.
307. U.S. GOLF Ass'N, http://www.usga.org/Rules (last visited Jan 24, 2011).
308. Interview with Joseph W. Anthony, supra note 304.
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the phone.309 Fortunately, the rules of golf safety are so firmly
anchored in common sense that they need no explanation. 31 0
Because one function of tort law is to deter socially undesirable be-
havior, 311 the law should be both accessible and sensible so that mem-
bers of society are on notice as to what is reasonably expected of
them.312 The negligence standard, because it conforms to the Rules of
Golf, satisfies this function.
ii. The Negligence Standard is Consistent with the Long-Standing
Traditions of Golf and the Spirit of the Game
As the Zurla court noted, golf is characterized by "long-standing
traditions in which courtesy between the players prevails." 13  Indeed,
"[e]tiquette is an essential and inextricable part of the game, which
has come to define golf's values worldwide." 314 Marked by courtesy
and sportsmanship, golf etiquette rises to the point where golfers call
penalties on themselves.3 1 5 A standard of reasonable care, which con-
forms to the Rules of Golf, is thus commensurate with the long-stand-
ing traditions of golf and the spirit of the game. 3 16
309. Id.
310. See Zurla v. Hydel, 681 N.E.2d 148, 152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) ("It is a matter of common
knowledge that players are expected not to drive their balls without giving warning when within
hitting distance of persons in the field of play, and that countless persons traverse golf courses
the world over in reliance on that very general expectation"). Indeed, the Rules of Safety basi-
cally point out the obvious point that it is simply unsafe to hit when someone might be hit by a
shot. See supra note 205 for a discussion of the Four Rules of Golf Safety.
311. See supra note 282 and accompanying text for a discussion of this function of tort law; see
also PROSSER, supra note 42, § 1, at 4 (noting that "the law of torts is concerned not solely with
individually questionable conduct but as well with acts which are unreasonable, or socially harm-
ful, from the point of view of the community as a whole").
312. Indeed, determining rights is one of the purposes of tort law. See supra note 313 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the purposes of tort law.
313. Zurla, 681 N.E.2d at 152.
314. Tiii R&A, http://www.randa.org/en/Rules-and-Amateur-Status/Etiquette.aspx (last vis-
ited Feb. 21, 2011).
315. PRitsszionin, supra note 1, at 121-22; see also Lazaroff, supra note 246, at 331 (noting that
golfers call penalties on themselves even when the penalties would have otherwise gone
undetected).
316. As the former General Counsel of the USGA, Joseph W. Anthony, pointed out "when
you look at the spirit of the game, the three overriding principles are honesty, integrity, and
courtesy. To substitute recklessness-in the place of negligence-as the standard [for golf course
injuries] is inconsistent with how the game has been played for all these years." Interview with
Joseph W. Anthony, supra note 304 (referring to THE R&A, SPIRIT OF THE GAME, available at
http://www.randa.org/en/Playing-Golf/Spirit-of-the-Game.aspx).
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iii. The Negligence Standard is Consistent with Golfers'
Reasonable Expectations
Golfers expect-and rely on-other golfers to abstain from rule vi-
olations.3 17 As the Rules note, golf "relies on the integrity of the indi-
vidual to show consideration for other players and to abide by the
Rules."318 Only "if [the rules of golf etiquette] are followed, [will] all
players gain maximum enjoyment from the game." 3 19 In particular,
golfers expect the customary warning of "fore" when they become en-
dangered by an errant golf ball.32 0 The fact that this warning "seems to
be recognized by golfers the world over," 321 is further evidence of
this. 322
Golfers' expectations are likewise supported by the disciplinary
provisions of the Rules. 3 2 3 The Rules provide that if a player consist-
ently disregards a rule of golf etiquette, it is recommended that disci-
plinary action be taken.324 One suggested remedy is to prohibit the
offending golfer from playing, which the Rules note is "justifiable in
terms of protecting the interests of the majority of golfers who wish to
play in accordance with" the Rules. 3 2 5 The negligence standard, be-
cause it conforms to the Rules of Golf, is thus consistent with golfers'
reasonable expectations.
iv. The Negligence Standard is Consistent with the Restatement
(Second) of Torts
The Second Restatement of Torts supports the negligence standard.
The Second Restatement notes that "participating in . . . a game does
not manifest consent to contacts which are prohibited by rules or us-
ages of the game if such rules or usages are defined to protect the
participants and not merely to secure the better playing of the game as
a test of skill."3 2 6 Under the Second Restatement view, therefore, par-
ticipants do not consent to violations of safety rules. Because the neg-
317. Zurla, 681 N.E.2d at 152.
318. U.S. GOLF Ass'N, supra note 8, at 1; THE R&A, supra note 194 at 10.
319. U.S. Goi Ass'N, supra note 8, at 1; Timn R&A, supra note 194, at 10.
320. Zurla, 681 N.E.2d at 152; Interview with Joseph W. Anthony, supra note 304.
321. Alexander v. Wrenn, 164 S.E. 715, 717 (Va. 1932) (noting that the duty to give "fore"
"seems to be recognized by golfers the world over, and [golfers] are so accustomed to its every-
day application that the word 'fore' is usually associated with the game and is recognized by
them as a warning cry").
322. Id.
323. U.S. GOLF Ass'N, supra note 195, at 4 (providing disciplinary recommendations for golf-
ers who consistently fail to follow golf etiquette).
324. Id.
325. Id. (emphasis added).
326. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) 86, § 50, Cmt. b.
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ligence standard conforms to the rules of golf safety, the negligence
standard is consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts.32 7
2. The Negligence Standard Merely Asks Golfers to Act Reasonably
Ultimately, the negligence standard is the appropriate approach be-
cause it merely asks golfers to act reasonably.328 Reasonableness is
what is required of individuals in nearly all aspects of life;3 2 9 a tee time
should not be a license to act unreasonably. Likewise, courts and ju-
ries are well-suited for assessing reasonableness-negligence is the
most common standard for assessing liability in modern tort law,3 30
and it is a standard firmly rooted in common sense.331 With the Rules
of Golf as a valuable tool for determining whether the defendant ac-
ted reasonably, the final decision hinges on negligence law 33 2 -a safe-
guard to ensure a sensible result.3 33
C. Refuting Potential Objections to the Negligence Standard
1. The Negligence Standard is Not Too Harsh on Defendants or
Bad Golfers
One potential objection to the negligence standard is that it is too
harsh on defendants and bad golfers. 3 3 4 Negligence, however, is not
strict liability; the mere occurrence of an injury will not expose golfers
to liability. 33 Nor will the mere occurrence of a poor shot lend itself
327. The Third Restatement is silent on this issue.
328. See supra notes 17, 46, 233 and accompanying text for a discussion of the point that the
ultimate determination under the negligence standard is whether the golfer acted reasonably.
329. Yasser, Perspective: In the Heat of Competition: Tort Liability of One Participant to An-
other: Why Can't Participants be Required to be Reasonable?, supra note 291, at 271.
330. See Note, supra note 293, at 2634.
331. See, e.g., Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law As Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Appeal For
Jury Adjudication, 88 MiCH. L. REv. 2348, 2389 (noting that a negligence standard appeals to a
jury's own commonsense judgment). Wells also argues that jurors' own notions about common-
sense concepts such as responsibility trump legal rules when assessing liability. Id. If this is true,
then certainly a standard such as negligence, which puts these issues right on the table for the
jury to assess, is better than recklessness, which badly obfuscates these issues.
332. See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of this point.
333. Cf Lazaroff, supra note 246, at 323 (noting that the negligence standard allows jurors to
consider all of the circumstances surrounding an injury to determine "whether a reasonably pru-
dent golfer should have foreseen the consequences and acted differently").
334. Although research has not discovered an explicit articulation of this argument, these con-
cerns seems to underlie the rationales for the recklessness standard-a standard that makes it
more difficult to impose liability on golfers-because poor golfers are more likely to hit wayward
shots than good golfers. See supra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of the rationales for the reckless-
ness standard.
335. Indeed, strict liability arguments have been flatly rejected by the courts and recognized
as "contrary to all [existing] authority." Carrigan v. Roussell, 426 A.2d 517, 521 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1981); Lazaroff, supra note 246, at 332 ("[T]he fact remains that strict liability is not
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to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor.336 Indeed, the negligence stan-
dard-although it does impose a greater standard of care on golfers
than recklessness-will not expose golfers to liability for poor shots so
long as they exercise ordinary care.3 37 And violations of the rules of
golf safety are not negligent per se.33 8 Moreover, the defenses of con-
tributory and comparative negligence can be raised if the plaintiff was
unreasonable in placing himself in the zone of danger.339
2. The Negligence Standard is the Appropriate Approach Even
Though Golfers are Sometimes Unable to React to a
Warning of "Fore!"
Another potential objection to the negligence standard is that there
should be no duty to yell "fore" because golfers are often unable to
react quick enough to avoid injury when a golf ball is mid-flight." 340
The negligence standard, however, is the more appropriate approach
for this exact reason: if it is unrealistic to react to a warning of "fore"
when a golf ball is mid-flight, then the solution is to encourage golfers
to warn before hitting-which the negligence standard does.341 Fur-
thermore, any concerns about this issue should be assuaged by the
what is being proposed [by the negligence standard]. The mere occurrence of an injury would
not, in itself, create tort liability").
336. Res ipsa loquitor, Latin for "the thing speaks for itself," is an evidentiary principle that
raises a presumption of negligence upon the happening of an event that does not usually occur in
the absence of negligence. WIIAAM L. PizOSSRZ I17 AL., supra note 42, § 39, at 244-45. For cases
that have rejected the doctrine in golf, see Nussbaum v. Lacopo, 27 N.Y.2d 311, 319 (1970)
(refusing to permit an application of res ipsa loquitor merely from the fact that defendant's shot
hooked sharply); Baker v. Thibodeaux, 470 So. 2d 245, 250 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting plain-
tiff's attempt to prove negligence by utilizing doctrine of res ipsa loquitor); Hampson v. Simon,
104 N.E.2d 112, 113 (111. App. Ct. 1952) ("No presumption of negligence arises from the mere
fact that a player on a golf course is hit by a ball driven by another player").
337. See supra note 34-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the point that the negli-
gence standard does not expect perfect shots; it merely expects reasonable care.
338. Other commentators have suggested a negligence per se standard for violations of safety
rules in recreational sports. See Rosenthal, supra note 274 at 2672.
339. Lazaroff, supra note 246, at 333.
340. Research on this topic has not indicated that this argument has been made yet. This
Comment merely anticipates that this argument could be made. For a case where a golfer did not
have time to react to a warning of "fore," see, e.g., Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio
1990). This paper offers no empirical findings on the effectiveness of the warning of "fore"-
instances where the warning was effective do not proceed to litigation. But common experience
suggests that this warning-a custom that has existed for centuries-is often effective.
341. See supra Part II.A.1 for a discussion of the point that negligence standard imposes a
duty on golfers to warn all those within the foreseeable zone of danger before hitting. See supra
Part II.C.2. for a discussion of the point that the recklessness standard seems to impose liability
only when the defendant fails to give warning before hitting when there are other individuals
within the intended line of flight.
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negligence standard's exception that there is no duty to warn if such a
warning would be futile. 3 4 2
3. The Negligence Standard is the Appropriate Approach Even
Though Some Cases Would Have Resulted in the Same
Disposition Under Either Standard
A third potential objection to the negligence standard is that there
is nothing wrong with the recklessness standard because many cases
result in the same disposition under either standard.3 4 3 Indeed,
Thompson,3 4 4 Hathaway,345 and Anand346 would have all been dis-
posed of on summary judgment under either standard because the
plaintiffs were not within the foreseeable zone of danger. 347 And
Schick348 and Shin34 9 were cases that would have gone to the jury
under either standard.3 50 Although this argument is meritorious, there
are at least three responses as to why it fails.3 51
342. See supra Part II.A.2.ii for a discussion of the exception to give warning if a warning
would be futile under the negligence standard.
343. Indeed, many recklessness cases within the scope of this paper would have resulted in
summary judgment under either standard, including: Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705
(Ohio 1990), Hathaway v. Tascosa Country Club, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993), and
Anand v. Kapoor, 877 N.Y.S.2d 425 (App. Div. 2009), aff'd, 942 N.E.2d 295 (N.Y. 2010). See
infra Appendix, figures 1 and 5 for diagrams of Thompson and Anand, respectively. See supra
notes 148-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of Hathaway. Similarly, Schick
v. Ferolito, 767 A.2d 969, 970 (N.J. 2001) and Shin v. Ahn, 165 P. 3d 581 (Cal. 2007) went to the
jury under the recklessness standard and, therefore, would have also gone to the jury under the
negligence standard. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text for the facts of Schick. See
supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of Shin. See infra Appen-
dix, figures 3 and 4 for diagrams of Schick and Shin, respectively.
344. Thompson, 559 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio 1990).
345. Hathaway. 846 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
346. Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d 425 (App. Div. 2009), aff'd, 942 N.E.2d 295 (N.Y. 2010).
347. See supra note 343 and accompanying text for a discussion of the point that all three of
these cases would have been disposed of on summary judgment under both the recklessness and
negligence standard. Furthermore, the duty to warn after the ball became errant was either satis-
fied as in the case of Hathaway or did not exist because a warning would be futile, as in the cases
of Thompson and Anand. See supra note 152 and accompanying text for a discussion of the point
that the duty to warn after the ball was hit was satisfied in Hathaway. See supra note 147 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the point that a warning would have been futile in Thomp-
son. See supra note 148 and accompanying text for a discussion of the point that a warning
would have been futile under in Anand.
348. Schick, 767 A.2d at 969.
349. Shin, 165 P.3d at 581.
350. Because these cases went to the jury to determine recklessness, it logically follows that
they would have been sent to the jury under the negligence standard by virtue of the fact that
recklessness is a more difficult standard for plaintiffs to satisfy.
351. A fourth argument is that a standard which reaches the right result, but based on the
wrong reasoning is not a good rule-especially when it is a standard that encourages unreasona-
ble behavior. See supra notes 262-65 for a discussion of the argument that the recklessness stan-
dard encourages unreasonable behavior.
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The first is that there are borderline cases where the result is not so
clear-cases that could go to the jury under the negligence standard,
but not under the recklessness standard. 3 52 These cases generally in-
volve a failure to warn when the plaintiff is fifty to 250 yards from the
defendant and within the zone of danger.3 3 Based on the Thompson
court's guidance that a golfer's failure to warn even when he knows
another individual is in the intended line of flight might not amount to
recklessness, 354 it is less likely that recklessness jurisdictions will allow
cases of this sort to go to the jury despite this conduct being a clear
violation of the Rules. 35
The second response is that even in cases that could reach the jury
under either standard, the negligence standard gives the jury a frame-
work with clearly defined rules and is capable of being applied consist-
ently and sensibly.356 In contrast, the nebulous nature of the
recklessness standard can lead to inconsistent jury determinations
352. See, e.g., Dilger v. Moyles, 54 Cal. App. 4th 1452, 1456 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that
defendant's failure to warn was possibly negligent, but not reckless).
353. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Parham, 160 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. 1968), infra Appendix, Figure 1,
(holding that whether defendant breached his duty to use ordinary care when he injured a plain-
tiff approximately 180 yards ahead, and approximately twenty yard from the intended line of
flight, was a jury question); Carrigan v. Roussell, 426 A.2d 517 (N.J. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that
plaintiff had duty to warn under the negligence standard when the defendant's ball hooked to-
wards the plaintiff, who was 200 to 220 yards away and forty to fifty yards from the intended line
of flight). Cf. Gray v. Giroux, 730 N.E.2d 338 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that plaintiff had
no cause of action against the defendant under the recklessness standard for a failure to warn
when the plaintiff was thirty-five to fifty yards away from the defendant and not within the
intended path of the shot).
354. Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705, 707 (Ohio 1990).
355. See supra text accompanying 205 for a discussion of the four rules of golf safety. But see
Maxwell v. Rowe, No. 97CA0075, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4396 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1998)
(holding that defendant's failure to warn both before and after hitting could have constituted
recklessness if he did not look to see whether plaintiff was within the intended line of flight, or
alternatively, if he knew that the plaintiff was within the intended line of flight and proceeded to
hit anyway). However, the dissent in Maxwell argued that "[t]aking a golf shot without looking
for others on ahead on the golf course may be negligent, but such action is not reckless." Id. at
*9 (Cacioppo, J., dissenting). The dissent's argument lends support to the fact that cases of this
sort at less likely to go to the jury under the recklessness standard.
356. See supra Part II.C.1 for an analysis of the point that golfer's duties under the negligence
standard are clearly defined because they are based on the rules of golf safety. Staunch advo-
cates of the recklessness standard will still argue only the most egregious rule violations should
give rise to liability. Fortunately, the common sense of jurors should ensure that plaintiffs are not
rewarded for minor infractions. See Burnstein, supra note 224, at 1021 ("a natural check exists in
the sensibilities of jurors. Jurors are less likely to allow recovery for a plaintiff unless they con-
sider the conduct of a defendant severe and a violation of the rule or a blatant disregard for the
ordinary care of co-participants").
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under nearly identical facts.357 Horizontal inconsistencies across simi-
larly situated plaintiffs offend traditional notions of fairness.3 58
The third response is that the negligence standard has the potential
to allow courts to establish a liability scheme for defining the contours
of conduct that is negligent as a matter of law.359 Much like the fifty-
degree rule for awarding summary judgment for defendants, negli-
gence courts can demarcate an area in which injury is so highly fore-
seeable that the defendant was negligent as a matter of law (or
rebuttably presumed negligent). 3 6 0 Although this might be an unusual
rule, if implemented just once, it could serve judicial economy and
further clarify the law. 3 6 1
D. A Few Additional Suggestions for Future Courts in Applying the
Negligence Standard
Although this Comment firmly urges courts to reject the reckless-
ness standard in favor of negligence, it would be unrealistic to suggest
that the negligence jurisprudence could not be improved. This Sec-
tion notes four areas where improvement may be possible and offers
some suggestions for how negligence courts should proceed.
357. Matthew G. Cole, Note and Comment, No Blood No Foul: The Standard of Care in
Texas Owed by Participants to One Another in Athletic Contests, 59 BAYLOR L. Ri v 435, 473
("Recklessness is an ambiguous standard that is impossible to apply accurately and consist-
ently"). See generally Rapp, The Wreckage of Recklessness, supra note 281 (arguing that the
troubled state of the recklessness standard creates inconsistencies).
358. Cf John L. Diamond, Eliminating the "Defect" in Design Strict Products Liability Theory,
34 HASTINGs L.J. 529, 540 (1983) (noting that arbitrary compensation schemes in the context of
products liability offend traditional notions of fairness).
359. The fact that recklessness is a more difficult standard for plaintiffs to satisfy makes estab-
lishing recklessness as a matter of law more impractical than a scheme that establishes negli-
gence as a matter of law.
360. Although courts would need to consider the totality of the circumstances in establishing
the whether foreseeability of injury is so high that there is no reason for the case to proceed to a
jury, common sense dictates that there are cases in which the defendant clearly breached a duty
of care. Perhaps ten to twenty degrees from the intended line of flight when the plaintiff and
defendant are at a close range-say, within twenty yards-could establish negligence as a matter
of law. As the distance between the plaintiff and the defendant increases, the deviation from the
intended line of flight required to establish negligence as a matter of law would be negatively
correlated until the foreseeability of injury is sufficiently low so as to require the question of
breach to be reserved for a jury.
361. One issue with establishing negligence as a matter of law is that these sorts of cases may
never proceed to trial-liability is clear and parties are likely to settle. Still, even if a defendant is
found to be negligent as a matter of law just once, such a ruling would establish a precedent and
thereby enhance the state of the law. Indeed, defining rights is one of the functions of tort law.
See RESTATEMENT (SFCOND) OF TORTs 901, supra note 288, at 900. Furthermore, just one prece-
dent would enable future parties to reach more efficient outcomes in settlement negotiations.
See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960) (arguing that
greater information allows parties to reach more efficient outcomes in bargaining).
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First, courts that make a distinction between plaintiffs in the same
group as the defendant and those in different groups 3 62 should lessen
the weight given to this consideration-or forget about it entirely.3 63
Instead, the focus should remain on the traditional analysis-that is,
whether it was foreseeable that the plaintiff might be injured.364
Whether a golfer is a member of a different foursome is merely one
factor that should be considered within the totality of the circum-
stances to determine whether injury was foreseeable.369
Second, courts should be cautious not to restrict the zone of danger
to the intended line of flight.366 As experience shows, it is entirely
foreseeable for a golf ball hit by even the most skilled golfer to stray
significantly from the line of flight.367 Similarly, courts should not sig-
nificantly reduce the foreseeable zone of danger merely because the
defendant is a highly skilled golfer or because the defendant has not
hit an errant shot for some time.3 6 8 While errant shots may be more
likely to originate from the club head of a poor golfer than a skilled
one, errant shots are never entirely unforeseeable-and scores of ac-
curate shots hit in succession do not guarantee that a golfer's next
drive will split the middle of the fairway.
Third, courts should be careful not to rely too heavily on prior law
at the expense of discounting the specific facts of the case. 369 Because
foreseeability is the most important factor in determining whether a
duty exists,370 prior law should be used as a compliment to the fore-
seeability analysis, not a substitute.
362. See supra notes 89-91 for a discussion of the distinction that some negligence courts
make between the duty owed to golfer's in one's own group and golfer's on other holes.
363. See supra note 91 for a discussion of the Supreme Court of California's argument that
this distinction is irrelevant and arbitrary.
364. Boozer v. Arizona Country Club, 434 P.2d 630, 633 (Ariz. 1967) ("Negligence is based on
foreseeability").
365. See supra Part II.A.1.ii.a. for a discussion of how courts determine the foreseeable zone
of danger by a consideration of the totality of the circumstances in the case.
366. See supra note 61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the minority rule of equating
the zone of danger to the intended line of flight.
367. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the point that bad shots
are inevitable even by the most highly skilled golfers; see also Nussbaum, 27 N.Y.2d at 319
("Golfers are notorious in the tedious preparation they give to a shot. They know that concen-
tration is the key to the game. Yet even the best professional golfers cannot avoid an occasional
'hook' or "slice."').
368. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text for Ludwikoski v. Kurotsu, 875 F. Supp.
727 (D. Kan. 1995), which applied this type of analysis.
369. See supra Part II.A.ii.b for a discussion of cases citing prior to law to determine whether
the plaintiff was within the foreseeable zone of danger.
370. Boozer v. Arizona Country Club, 434 P.2d 630, 633 (Ariz. 1967) ("Negligence is based on
foreseeability."); see also Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334, 342
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Courts should, however, use the fifty-degree line as a tool of exclu-
sion;371 cases in which the plaintiff was not within fifty degrees from
the intended line of flight should result in awarding summary judg-
ment to the defendant. 3 7 2 In extreme cases, such as when the defen-
dant has a severe propensity to shank,373 courts can be more flexible.
While not dispositive in all cases, the fifty-degree line is certainly a
useful tool and serves judicial economy.
Fourth, courts should reconsider holding minor golfers to the adult
standard of care under the adult-activities rule.37 4 On one hand, it is
indeed true that a golf ball is equally as dangerous whether it is hit by
an adult or a minor,379 and it is likewise true that holding minors to
the adult standard of care will encourage golfers to learn golf etiquette
at an early age. 3 7 6 But on the other hand, holding minors to the adult
standard of care might discourage minors from participating in the
sport altogether. And unlike driving a car without a license-a dan-
gerous activity that the minor should not be doing in the first place377
-our society wants to encourage youths to play golf.378
Moreover, when a minor is behind the wheel of an enclosed motor
vehicle, the adult is unable to detect that he is encountering a minor,
(Cal. 1976) (noting that foreseeability of harm is the most important consideration in determin-
ing the existence of a duty).
371. See supra notes 70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fifty-degree line. See
infra Appendix for a visual representation of the fifty degree line.
372. See supra Part II.A.ii.b. for a discussion of how prior law-especially the fifty-degree
line-can be used to award summary judgment for defendants.
373. One such case was Cook v. Johnston, 688 P.2d 215 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). See supra note
64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the extreme facts of Cook.
374. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the adult-activities rule.
375. Neumann v. Shlansky, 294 N.Y.S.2d 628, 632-33 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 1968), aff'd, 312
N.Y.S.2d 951 (N.Y. App. Term 1970), aff'd, 318 N.Y.S.2d 925 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971). Of course,
this assumes that the ball is traveling at the same speed regardless of whether it was hit by the
adult or the minor.
376. Cf Lazaroff, supra note 246, at 331-32 (arguing that a negligence standard "would en-
courage proper instruction in the rules and etiquette of golf from the inception of a player's
participation in the sport"); Note, supra note 274, at 2672-73 (arguing that a negligence per se
rule based on safety-based rule violations in recreational sports would "return the focus ... of
recreational league sports to education and fun, without excessive violence"); Ray Yasser, Per-
spective, supra note 261, at 262 (arguing that the negligence standard is the appropriate ap-
proach because at all levels of sports, participants need to be "restrained not emboldened").
377. See, e.g., Daniels v. Evans, 224 A.2d 63, 65 (N.H. 1966) (noting that it would be unsound
public policy to allow a hold a minor to a lower standard of care than an adult when operating a
motor vehicle).
378. See generally THE FIRST TEE, http://www.thefirsttee.org/Club/Scripts/Home/home.asp
(Last visited March 19, 2011) ("The First Tee Provides young people of all backgrounds an op-
portunity to develop life-enhancing values such as confidence, perseverance and judgment
through golf and character education").
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and therefore cannot take necessary precautions.3 79  On the golf
course, however, the adult can easily detect the minor and proceed
accordingly. 380 On balance, there might be valid reasons for applying
the adult-activities rule to golfing minors, but the weight of authority
suggests that they should be held to the standard of care of a reasona-
ble minor of like age, intelligence, and experience.3 8 1
E. A Few Suggestions for Courts that insist on Applying the
Recklessness Standard
Undoubtedly, many courts will continue to insist on applying the
recklessness standard in light of the strength of the current trend.3 8 2
But the next time a severely injured plaintiff seeks compensation in
one of these jurisdictions, their courts should take the opportunity to
improve their jurisprudence in at least two ways.
First, recklessness courts should take a closer reading of Thomp-
son.383 The Thompson court recognized that golf is a relatively safe
sport in which physical contact is rare.3 8 4 The court noted the inverse
relationship between dangerousness and duty to point out that golfers
have a heightened duty to use ordinary care compared to participants
in inherently dangerous sports, such as football.389 The logical corol-
lary of these observations is that a lesser deviation from the standard
of reasonable care is required to hold a golfer reckless than to hold a
football player reckless. This principle should guide future courts
when they determine whether to allow plaintiffs to move past the
pleading or summary judgment stage under the recklessness standard.
379. RiST AITEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 10 cmt. f
380. For example, the adult can move farther away from the minor's intended line of flight or
take cover behind a tree. A creative argument (never suggested in the case law) could be made
for a bifurcated approach: when the adult can observe the minor (such as when the adult and
minor are playing together), the minor should be held to the standard of care of a minor; when
the adult cannot observe the minor (such as when the minor is on another hole), the minor
should be held to the standard of care of an adult. If this were the only rationale for the stan-
dard, perhaps such an approach could work. Moreover, this approach would be problematic
because it would require probing into what the adult subjectively knew.
381. Neumann v. Shlansky, 294 N.Y.S.2d 628, 632-33 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 1968), aff'd, 312
N.Y.S.2d 951 (N.Y. App. Term 1970), affd, 318 N.Y.S.2d 925 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971). It could be
argued that it is inconsistent to suggest that adults should be held to the adult standard-which
makes no account for intelligence or experience-while children should be given a break. How-
ever, refusing to hold children to the adult-activities rule would not give children a break: it
would restore their standard of care to the standard they are held to in all other aspects of their
lives.
382. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the current trend of adopting the recklessness
standard to golf.
383. Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio 1990).
384. Id. at 708-09.
385. Id. at 708.
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Second, recklessness courts should provide the Second Restate-
ment's definition of recklessness with the proper burial it deserves. 386
The Third Restatement approach, which considers the cost of avoid-
ance in relation to the magnitude of the risk,3 87 is more in line with
overall trends in tort law.3 88 While not a panacea for an ailing stan-
dard,389 if applied, this approach would likely allow more cases to pro-
ceed to the jury,390 thus softening the harsh effects of the current
recklessness jurisprudence. Such a result could perhaps appease advo-
cates of the negligence standard-if only slightly.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts should reject the current trend and reaffirm the negligence
standard as the appropriate standard for golf. The rationales for the
recklessness standard-a standard that has its roots in sports where
physical contact is the norm391-simply do not hold up when applied
to golf. 39 2 Occupying an uncertain penumbra between negligence and
intent, recklessness is a nebulous standard incapable of being consist-
ently applied.3 93 In stark contrast, the negligence standard largely con-
forms to the well-established Rules of Golf. 3 94 As a result, the
negligence standard provides courts and golfers with a clearly defined
standard of care,399 is in keeping with the spirit of the game, 396 is con-
386. See supra note 281-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the confusion surround-
ing the Second Restatement's definition of recklessness.
387. See supra note 123 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Third Restatement's
definition of recklessness.
388. See RAHDFRT, supra note 293, at 12 (noting that the trend in tort law has been to move
away from a moral perspective towards a pragmatic one); Note, supra note 274, at 2633-34 (not-
ing that the trend in tort law has been to move away from a fault-based "writ system" towards
one where courts balance the social benefit of an activity with the risk of harm).
389. See, e.g., Rapp, supra note 281, at 178 (noting that the authors of the Third Restatement
acknowledge the deficiencies with their definition) (citing Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2, cmt.
b ("[Defining recklessness requires] acknowledging and balancing several factors")).
390. Because the costs of warning on the golf course are minimal relative to the magnitude of
potential injury, it is more likely that, on average, a reasonable juror could find that a golfer was
reckless.
391. See supra note 235 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fact that the reckless-
ness standard has its roots in contact sports.
392. See supra Part 11I.A.1 for an analysis of the rationales for the recklessness standard in
recreational sports and the argument that they do not hold up when applied to the more genteel
game of golf.
393. See supra Part III.A.2 for a discussion of the nebulous nature of the recklessness stan-
dard and the resulting difficulties in its application.
394. See supra Part II.C.1 for an analysis of the conformity between the Rules of Golf and the
negligence standard.
395. See infra Part III.B.1.i for a discussion of the argument that the negligence standard,
because it conforms to the Rules of Golf, provides courts and golfers with a clearly defined
standard of care.
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sistent with golfers' reasonable expectations,397 and is consistent with
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 98 Moreover, this standard merely
asks golfers to act reasonably 99-a flexible and commonsense ap-
proach that courts and juries have great experience in applying-so
that severely injured plaintiffs are not forced to bear the costs of pre-
ventable injuries caused by negligent conduct.400
Concerns about the negligence standard are well-intentioned, but
misguided. Specifically, the negligence standard is not too harsh on
defendants or bad golfers, and liability will not result merely for poor
shots.401 Undoubtedly, there are a few areas where the negligence ju-
risprudence can be improved. 402 Yet the standard is still a much more
appropriate approach than recklessness.
Because of the strength of the current trend, many courts are likely
to insist on applying the recklessness standard.403 The next time a
plaintiff with severe or fatal injuries, like Hiroshi, seeks compensation
in one of these jurisdictions, these courts should use the opportunity
to refine their jurisprudence 4 0 4 or reject the recklessness standard out-
right. Only then will the law once again become more aligned with the
customs and long-standing traditions of golf-a game defined by
"honesty, integrity, and courtesy," 405 in which players routinely call
penalties on themselves and reasonably expect, and rely on, other
players to follow the safety rules of the sport. The current trend is
indeed alarming and needs to be seriously reconsidered. It is time for
396. See infra Part III.B.1.ii for a discussion of the argument that the negligence standard,
because it conforms to the Rules of Golf, is consistent with the long-standing traditions of golf
and the Spirit of The Game.
397. See infra Part 111.B.1.iv for a discussion of the argument that the negligence standard,
because it conforms to the Rules of Golf, is consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
398. See supra Part III.B.2 for an analysis of the argument that the negligence standard is the
appropriate approach because it merely asks golfers to act reasonably-a flexible and common-
sense standard that courts and juries have great experience in applying.
399. See supra notes 292-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the argument that the
negligence standard, unlike the recklessness standard, does not force negligently injured plain-
tiffs to bear the costs of preventable injuries.
400. See supra Part 111.C.1 for a discussion of the argument that the negligence standard is not
too harsh on defendants or bad golfers.
401. See supra Part II.D. 1 for the argument that the negligence standard is not too harsh on
defendants or bad golfers.
402. See supra Part 111.D for a discussion of a few areas where the negligence jurisprudence
can be improved.
403. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the current trend of applying the recklessness
standard to golf.
404. See supra part 11.E for a discussion of some ways in which the recklessness jurispru-
dence can be improved.
405. See THE R&A, supra notes 199-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of golf
etiquette.
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courts to reject the recklessness standard and respect the Rules of
Golf.
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FIGURE 1
SELECTED CASES FROM THE NEGLIGENCE
JURISPRUDENCE
50 Degree Line
Court: Not Negligent as a Matter of Law
Jury Question
Jury: Negligent
Jury: Negligent; Court: JNOV.
A, C
B:F
E
D
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NEGLIGENCE CASES EXPLAINED
A. Carrigan v. Roussell, 426 A. 2d 517 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1981).
Commentary: Plaintiff was taking a lesson on the driving range when
defendant hit a hooked shot from the first tee. Because the defendant
gave a timely and adequate warning of "fore" once it became apparent
that the shot was errant, the court held that the defendant was not negli-
gent as a matter of law. This case was decided before New Jersey
adopted the recklessness standard in 2001 in Schick v. Ferolito
B. McWilliams v. Parham, 160 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. 1968).
Commentary: Plaintiff-caddie was hurrying from the thirteenth green to
the fourteenth tee when he was struck by defendant's shot from the thir-
teenth tee. Defendant satisfied his duty to warn after the ball was hit, but
the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the trial court's grant of
a nonsuit because defendant could have been negligent in failing to
warn before hitting.
C. Rose v. Morris, 104 S.E.2d 485 (Ga. Ct. App. 1954).
Commentary: Although the court held that defendant was not negligent
as a matter of law, plaintiff was playing on another fairway.
D. Benjamin v. Nernberg, 157 A.10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1931).
Commentary: This case represents the farthest plaintiff from the in-
tended line of flight to ever receive a jury verdict in his favor. The court,
however, entered a J.N. 0. V. The fifty degree line on each figure in this
Appendix is derived from this case. The fifty degree line generally de-
marks the foreseeable zone of danger. The limits of the zone of danger
are more likely somewhere within fifty degrees-although it is impossi-
ble to say precisely where-and turn on the specific facts of the case.
The fifty degree line has been used by courts as a tool of exclusion
whereby a finding that plaintiff was outside its contours results in a
finding that defendant was not negligent as a matter of law. A finding
that the plaintiff was within fifty degrees of the intended line of flight,
however, does not necessary mean that plaintiff was within the zone of
danger.
E. Alexander v. Wrenn, 164 S.E. 715 (Va. 1932).
Commentary: Jury found defendant negligent, and the Supreme Court
of Virginia affirmed.
F. Allen v. Pinewood Country Club, 292 So.2d 786 (La. Ct. App.
1974).
Commentary: Plaintiff was on a different fairway and had his back
turned to defendants. Defendant gave warning buy immediately pro-
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ceeded to hit before ascertaining whether plaintiff had a chance to heed
the warning.
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FIGURE 2
THOMPSON V. MCNEIL, 559 N.E.2D 705 (OHIO 1990)
--- - 50 Degree Line
Thompson v McNeil
(Not Reckless as a Matter of Law)
-------------------------------------------------------
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FIGURE 3
SCHICK V. FEROLITO, 767 A.2D 962 (N.J. 2001)
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-- - - 50 Degree Line
Schick v. Ferolito
(Jury Question to Determine Reckless)
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FIGURE 4
SHIN V. AHN, 165 P.3D 581 (CAL. 2008)
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--- - 50 Degree Line
Shin v. Ahn
(Juy Question to Determine Whether
Plantiff Assumed the Risk)
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FIGURE 5
ANAND v. KAPOOR, 2009 NY SLIP Op. 3110 (N.Y. App.
Div. APRIL 29, 2009), AFF'D, 2010 N.Y. SLIP OP.
9380 (N.Y. DEC. 21, 2010)
---- 50 Degree Line
Anand v- Kapoor
(Not Reckless/Plaintiff Assumed
the Risk)
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